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CAB 163/62

Date of Registration

162

J	File Number
<del>2325/1 Pt 2</del>	
Previous Reference <del>325/1 Pt 2</del>	
For Cross References see inside of Cover	

Joint Intelligence Committee

ADMINISTRATION  
SUBVERSION

Soviet and Chinese Motives for their Activities in Africa  
JIC (Bu) 57.

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date

**CLOSED**  
Continued  
Jolis No 44  
Date 2.6.65  
1967  
ft. 3.  
8.  
9.2.67.

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325/1 Pt 2

**TOP SECRET**

Other Files containing Matter Bearing on this Subject.

TOP SECRET

File No.

Subject

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First Review

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82 325/1

This file has now passed out of active use. Under the Public Records Act 1958, it must be reviewed within five years to determine whether it should be destroyed or retained for departmental use.

This file should accordingly be -

- a. destroyed on 31.12.19... or
- b. retained for administrative purposes for 25 years.

Signature..... *Arthur Bunn*  
JIC

Date ..... 18 January 1973 .....

Notes

1. Where the file has only short-term usefulness (ie extending to at most five years) it should be marked at (a) for destruction at a pre-determined time when it is judged likely to have ceased to be of any further use to the Department.
2. Where it cannot be so treated (b) will apply. Each file so retained will be subject to a second review at 25 years by the Departmental Record Officer who, in conjunction with the Public Records Office Liaison Officer, will decide whether it should be transferred to the Public Records Office for permanent preservation. Material destined for the Public Records Office will be withheld for so long as security considerations require.

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**CLOSED** 1967

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Yolo Nos 44-87.

Date. 2. 6. 65 - 9. 2. 67.

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*See Bucle List*

FOLIO  
87.

Ref: B01365

9th February 1967



325/1.

The probable character of future black African leadership

(JIC(67)6(Final))

Many thanks for your letter of 2nd February covering a copy of the above report. I quite take the point you make in your penultimate paragraph about the major defect which the Committee found in the draft, but I very much agree that the task which was set was almost an impossible one. Looking at the report from the point of view of the study which my Committee is trying to make I confess that I should have liked to have seen some reference to the effect of the trends of economic development (or the lack of it) in black Africa on both the type and effectiveness of future leadership and also some rather fuller consideration of the effect on both of the fissiparous tendencies of tribalism right through Africa. But such a requirement would be to make an almost impossible task wholly impossible! In any event, I have no doubt whatever that this study will be extremely useful to us in approaching our own report, some of whose problems will, I am sure, turn out to be equally impossible.

*See Mr -*

*See 2. M 192*  
*14/2 Ch 115 to see and return JDF*  
*Register.*

*T. Rogers*


(P. ROGERS)

D. A. Greenhill, Esq., CMG., OBE.,  
Foreign Office.

E.R.

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J 325/1



FOLIO  
86.

MR. W.K. REID

I attach Sir Burke Trend's copy of JIC(67)6(Final), "The Probable Character of Future Black African Leadership". It is in large measure speculative but envisages no predictable change except perhaps as a result of a continuation of minority rule in Rhodesia.

2. This is the report which Mr. Greenhill sent to Mr. Rogers on 2nd February (you will have had a copy of his minute) for inclusion in the OPD(O)Africa Sub-Committee's general study of Africa. The JIC do not recommend distribution to Ministers, partly for this reason and also for other reasons which Mr. Greenhill has explained in his minute to Mr. Rogers.

Brooks Richards.

9th February 1967

(F. B. RICHARDS)

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8th February 1967

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You will by now have received a copy of JIC(67) 6 (Final) - "The Probable Character of Future Black African Leadership".

2. We have sent copies to the Deputy Secretary of the Cabinet, and to the Secretary of the Cabinet, but are not otherwise giving it more than JIC distribution. You may find it useful in your own studies, if they are still going on, but I imagine it will be used mainly in the course of the general study on Africa by the OPD(O) Africa Sub-Committee.
3. I attach a copy of a letter which Mr. Greenhill recently sent to the Chairman of the OPD(O) Sub-Committee. You may be interested in his remarks.

84

JF

(J.P. FOSTER)

R.L. Wade-Gery, Esq.,  
Foreign Office Planning Staff

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Reg to hold for file

(I expect we'll get

the original too, soon) JTH 3/2

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FOLIO  
84

2 February 1967

3251.

The Probable Character of Future Black African  
Leadership  
(JIC(67)6(Final))

....

I enclose a copy of the above report, which the Joint Intelligence Committee has just approved, for use in connection with your forthcoming OPDO Africa Sub-Committee study. The Secretary, JIC, is also sending copies to the Secretary of the Cabinet and the Foreign Office Planning Staff. We are not, however, sending copies to posts abroad, or recommending distribution to Ministers, for the following reasons.

The JIC, at their meeting on 26 January - of which you will have seen the minutes (JIC(67)4th meeting, Minute 5) - considered that the report, while an excellent attempt at an almost impossible task, did not really stand in its own right and was, in one major aspect, unsatisfactory.

The report treats some points only sketchily, as these are covered in JIC(66)14 - "The Future of the OAU" - and JIC(66)23 - "The Outlook for the Emergence of Military Régimes and their Prospects in Africa"; or will be to some extent covered in JIC(66)53 - "The Prospects for Southern Africa up to 1976" - which, as Mr. Richards has told you, should be ready in final form shortly after 16 February. The latter is being prepared in a long and short form; the long version including a separate outlook study for each of the countries in the area from the Portuguese African territories and Rhodesia southwards.

The major defect which the Committee found was that the report did not really give the issue of South Africa the place which it merited. It would be the outcome

/of the...

P. Rogers Esq., CB, CMG,  
Cabinet Office.

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of the conflict between the Black African States and South Africa which would condition the outlook of future black African leaders, though it was debatable how they would react if frustrated on this central issue. Britain could not avoid being involved when, as seemed likely to occur in the not too distant future, the campaign against South Africa within the United Nations developed to a critical point.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Sir Burke Trend.

D.A. Greenhill

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EXTRACT from J I C (67) 10<sup>th</sup> MEETING held on 5.1.67.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. PROSPECTS FOR BLACK AFRICA UNDER THE  
NEXT GENERATION OF LEADERS

*325/1* AIR CHIEF MARSHAL EARLE said that he was concerned that the broad scope of the recently issued terms of reference for a JIC report on the above subject (JIC(67) 6) might prove incompatible with the short time that was apparently to be allowed for its production. It seemed to him doubtful whether there was any hope of producing a worthwhile paper for consideration by the Committee by 19th January. He questioned whether, in view of the fact that the assessment was required for inclusion in a Foreign Office paper, the request was one which should properly have been put to the Joint Intelligence Committee at all.

In discussion the following points were made -

(a) The information requested by the Foreign Office did constitute an intelligence contribution to a wider paper. The time factor would not necessarily preclude the reasoned examination which was required as the report was not likely to be a long one. There was not in this case a wide range of factual evidence to consider and the speculative parts of the report would not take long to write.

(b) The Joint Intelligence Staff had the previous day held a useful meeting with representatives of the Commonwealth Office and of the Defence Intelligence Staff to discuss Commonwealth and economic matters. They had already obtained a good deal of material on which a first draft of the report could be based.

Summing up, THE CHAIRMAN said that the requirement stemmed from the Foreign Secretary and the questions seemed legitimate ones to put to the JIC. The Committee should try to meet the requirement. The matter should be taken by the Committee on 19th January and they would then have an opportunity of considering whether the draft report would be a worthwhile contribution.

The Committee -

- (1) Took note, with approval, of the Chairman's summing up.
- (2) Instructed the Chairman, Joint Intelligence Staff to proceed with the drafting of JIC(67) 6.
- (3) Instructed the Secretary to place an appropriate item on the agenda for their meeting on 19th January.

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5. THE PROBABLE CHARACTER OF FUTURE BLACK  
AFRICAN LEADERSHIP

325/1

The Committee had before them JIC(67) 6 (Revised Draft) on the above subject, together with amendments proposed by the Joint Intelligence Staff.

MR. WALSH ATKINS said that he wished to propose that the distribution of this paper, when finalized, should be limited. The study had originally been called for by the Foreign Office and sought to answer two specific questions, which were set out at paragraph 1 of the text. In addition, the Deputy Secretary of the Cabinet had revived the OFD Official Sub-Committee on Africa, which had on 23rd January agreed to resume work on a study of future policy in Africa (OFDO(A)(67) 1st Meeting). The OFDO(A) study would make use of the Foreign Office study and would additionally draw on a number of recent JIC studies on Africa, including the present draft and JIC(66) 53 (Draft) - "The Prospects for Southern Africa up to 1976". In the circumstances it seemed preferable that JIC(67)6 should be passed to the Chairman, OFDO(A) and to the Foreign Office Planning Staff and otherwise given only JIC distribution. The draft itself was an excellent attempt at an almost impossible task.

In discussion there was general agreement with Mr. Walsh Atkins' remarks. In addition the following points were made -  
(a) It was argued, on the one hand, that the report was pure speculation and was not, properly speaking, intelligence at all; and on the other hand, that the Committee should not avoid a campaign developed against South Africa within the United Nations. He would like to make these points in a covering letter to the Chairman of the OFDO(A) Sub-Committee and the Secretary should prepare a draft covering letter accordingly.

The Committee -

- (1) Approved the report as amended and instructed the Secretary to issue it to a JIC distribution only.
- (2) Took note that the Chairman would also pass a copy of the report under a covering letter to the Chairman of the OFD Official Sub-Committee on Africa.
- (3) Instructed the Secretary also to send a copy of the report under a covering letter to the Foreign Office Planning Staff.

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responsibility for the preparation of speculative assessments where these were required.

(b) It should be borne in mind that some of the points which the present draft covered only sketchily had been treated at length in other reports - that on Southern Africa (JIC(66) 53 (Draft)) mentioned above; that on "The Outlook for the Emergence of Military Regimes and their Prospects in Africa" (JIC(66) 23); and that on "The Future Organisation of African Unity" (JIC(66) 14).

(c) Some experts in Whitehall appeared to have altered their view since JIC(66) 23 was issued and now held that military coups were less likely than was suggested in that paper; but the narrow base on which power rested in most black African countries carried with it a built-in risk of military coups and the situation in such a country would never be the same again once a coup had occurred.

Summing up, THE CHAIRMAN said he personally thought the report unsatisfactory in that it did not really give the issue of South Africa the place which it merited. It would be the outcome of the conflict between the black African states and South Africa which would condition the outlook of the future black African leaders. It was debatable how they would react if frustrated on this central issue. Britain could not avoid being involved when, as seemed likely to occur in the not too distant future a campaign developed against South Africa within the United Nations. He would like to make these points in a covering letter to the Chairman of the OPDO(A) Sub-Committee and the Secretary should prepare a draft covering letter accordingly.

The Committee -

- (1) Approved the report as amended and instructed the Secretary to issue it to a JIC distribution only.
- (2) Took note that the Chairman would also pass a copy of the report under a covering letter to the Chairman of the OPD Official Sub-Committee on Africa.
- (3) Instructed the Secretary also to send a copy of the report under a covering letter to the Foreign Office Planning Staff.

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R E TSIR BURKE TREND

CABINET OFFICE	
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- 4 JAN 1967	
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c. c. Mr. Lawrence Wilson  
 Mr. Richards  
 Mr. Harrison  
 Mr. Moriarty ~~32511~~

You will recall that some eighteen months ago the Africa Official Committee embarked on a study of the next ten years in Africa, with particular reference to the importance of United Kingdom interests in the Continent. I suspended this work after the illegal declaration of independence by Rhodesia both because many of those primarily concerned were then so busy with the Rhodesian problems that they could not take part in longer term studies of this nature, and because idl had thrown the whole future of Africa into such a state of flux that it was dubious whether a study of likely developments in the next ten years was worth while making at all. At the same time, I said that in certain respects I very much regretted having to drop the study, since in so far as it concerned the importance of United Kingdom interests in Africa over the next decade, it was extremely relevant to some of the issues of policy to be decided in the course of the Rhodesian crisis.

While the uncertainty arising because of Rhodesia is hardly less now than it was a year ago, the pressure of work at the senior level has, I think, dropped somewhat for the time being. Furthermore, the importance of defining United Kingdom interests in Africa in the longer term has, I think, become more important in relation to Rhodesia than it was when we were engaged in the tactical exercises of considering whether we could achieve a settlement. Finally, the attached note by the JIC (JIC(67)6 (Terms of Reference)) on the study which they are making of the prospects for "black" Africa under the next generation of leaders suggests that Ministers themselves are likely to take a greater interest in the general study of the kind I have mentioned.

If you agree, I therefore propose to revive the work of the Africa Committee on their longer term study and to seek to bring it to a conclusion in the course of the next three months. I mention to you at this stage because this may well be queried by some Departments and the matter may be raised with you by the Permanent Secretaries concerned. However, it is also relevant that just before Christmas Sir Neil Pritchard told me that the Commonwealth Office were, for some <sup>but</sup> comparable reasons, resurrecting the proposal for the study of the future of the Commonwealth which I put to you also just before the idl. I hope, therefore, that any protest by Departments will prove not to be unmanageable.

3rd January, 1967

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S/F

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56-51.

JIC 1054/66

COPY NO. \_\_\_\_\_

13th December 1966

CABINET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

3251  
3591.

SOVIET POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA  
AND THEIR LIKELY DEVELOPMENT

The attached Draft Terms of Reference have been prepared by the Joint Intelligence Staff and are circulated for comment, if any, to the Chairman, Joint Intelligence Staff by NOON on FRIDAY, 16th DECEMBER 1966. (DIS comments to DISSEC (SJIRO) by 5 p.m. on THURSDAY, 15th DECEMBER 1966. )

(Signed) J.P. FOSTER

for Secretary,  
Joint Intelligence Committee

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

13th December 1966.

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DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE  
JIC(66)

SOVIET POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA  
AND THEIR LIKELY DEVELOPMENT

There is a requirement (JIC Minutes 49th Meeting, Item 8) for a re-examination of Soviet policy towards the Middle East and North Africa. It should assess whether Soviet policy has undergone, or is likely to undergo, any change and whether or not it is likely to contribute to greater instability in the area.

2. It is proposed to exclude for the purposes of this paper Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. Iran, which was recently examined in JIC(66) 33 (Final), will be referred to only briefly, as will the Somali Republic, Soviet arms deliveries which were examined in JIC(66) 36 (Final).

3. The report will consider Soviet policies, illustrated as necessary by evidence of their activities, under the following broad headings:-

- (a) Soviet political relations with countries in the area;
- (b) Soviet supply of military equipment and training;  
the Soviet military presence in the area;
- (c) Soviet support for subversion both against the Governments  
in the area, and undertaken by these Governments against  
other countries;
- (d) Non-military Soviet economic aid;
- (e) Soviet trade with countries in the area;
- (f) Soviet scientific, technical and cultural aid to the area;
- (g) The main trends and features of Soviet propaganda.

It should then consider likely future developments and their implications for British and American interests.

4. In contributing under the headings given in paragraph 3 above it is hoped that Departments will characterise the main features of Soviet policies for the area and avoid a detailed treatment which would result in a report of excessive length.

5. Departments are invited to send their contributions to the Chairman, Joint Intelligence Staff, to reach him by NOON on MONDAY, 16th JANUARY 1966.

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Reference: JIC 1007/66 (Final)

COPY NO. 43

6th December, 1966.

CABINET  
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

325/1  
219/2.

POSSIBILITY AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROVISION  
BY THE SOVIET UNION OF FORCES FOR UNITED NATIONS  
USE AGAINST RHODESIA OR FOR THE ENFORCEMENT  
OF SANCTIONS

Departments may wish to note that the above report has been passed to the following -

Prime Minister  
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs  
First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Economic Affairs  
Chancellor of the Exchequer  
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs  
Lord President of the Council  
Secretary of State for Defence  
Lord Chancellor  
Minister of Overseas Development  
Secretary of State for the Colonies  
Paymaster-General  
Attorney-General

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

6th December, 1966.

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*JPF* (73)

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IMMEDIATE

JIC 1007/66(Final)

CABINET  
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

*325/1*  
*219/2*

POSSIBILITY AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROVISION BY THE  
SOVIET UNION OF FORCES FOR UNITED NATIONS USE AGAINST  
RHODESIA OR FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS  
(Previous reference: JIC(66) 49th Meeting, Item 11)

The attached Note by the Joint Intelligence Committee has been prepared for the information of Ministers concerned with Rhodesia and is circulated for information and record.

(Signed) J.P. FOSTER  
for Secretary,  
Joint Intelligence Committee

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.  
2nd December 1966

DISTRIBUTION

Cabinet Ministers (if approved by the Secretary of the Cabinet)  
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Annex to JIC 1007/66(Final)

THE POSSIBILITY AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROVISION BY THE  
SOVIET UNION OF FORCES FOR UNITED NATIONS USE AGAINST  
RHODESIA OR FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS BY BLOCKADE

Note by the Joint Intelligence Committee

In this note we examine the capability of the Soviet Union, its allies and other pro-Communist countries to provide forces for a United Nations enforcement of sanctions against Rhodesia or for direct military operations against Rhodesia under United Nations auspices, and the likelihood that they would do so. We also examine the implications of Soviet participation in such United Nations action against Rhodesia.

MILITARY CAPABILITIES  
(For further details see Appendix)

Assumption

2. We assume that in the context of a United Nations operation any ports, airfields and transit facilities required in black Africa would be made available to a United Nations force.

United Nations Blockading Force

3. The Soviet Union would not be able to provide a whole naval/air force needed for a complete United Nations-sponsored blockade of Southern Africa, though she could easily provide a force to blockade Mozambique. She could however provide a major contribution of ships and land-based aircraft for the ~~largest~~ task. A force of the size the Soviet Union could provide, though not guaranteeing interception, might in itself be sufficient to deter blockade runners.

4. Of the Warsaw Pact and other countries under Soviet influence only Poland, Bulgaria and the UAR might be able to contribute ships, and none could contribute long-range maritime patrol aircraft. Their maximum contribution of ships would be less than half the minimum force required and we consider that in practice they would be unlikely to make more than a token contribution. These countries could not provide ships for replenishment at sea, and their ships would therefore be dependent on ports (which would reduce their effectiveness) or on afloat support from some other country or countries.

United Nations Intervention Force

5. The Soviet Union could, on its own, provide sufficient ground troops, air forces and logistic backing for a successful invasion of Rhodesia, though it would take considerable time and effort to mount and maintain.

6. Poland and Czechoslovakia could provide a significant contribution to a United Nations force in the form of combat troops but would be dependent on some other country for air transport. The UAR could in theory contribute a parachute battalion and a commando, but would probably, for military reasons alone, be most reluctant to do so.

7. Any contribution by the Warsaw Pact allies of the Soviet Union to a United Nations air force would be dependent on air transport backing provided by the Soviet Union or some other country, and the air forces concerned are not trained for long range overseas deployment. We therefore consider that a contribution would be made only if Soviet forces were deployed, and even then would be of a token nature.

LIKELY SOVIET INTENTIONS

The United Nations

8. When the Rhodesian problem is placed before the United Nations, Soviet tactics are likely to be governed in part by the Soviet Union's long-standing opposition to the United Nations setting up forces for peace-keeping purposes. So we would expect the Russians, fearing a dangerous precedent, to oppose equally the creation of a United Nations force for action against Rhodesia. However Soviet action will also be influenced by political opportunism and a desire to exploit any chance of a clear propaganda advantage, and the Soviet Government will certainly hope to avoid any visible opposition to the wishes of African countries. But it will be the Soviet aim to use such procedural devices as are available to avoid direct Soviet involvement in any action undertaken by the United Nations, and to place the onus and responsibility for such action, or its obstruction, on the Western powers. This nevertheless presents a difficult dilemma for the Soviet Union who do not wish to be involved but at the same time need to appear in the van of anti-imperialists.

Soviet attitudes to the Rhodesia question

9. In Soviet eyes the Rhodesian problem is, compared with Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet quarrel, of minor importance. The Russians consider Britain alone responsible for the problem, and will insist that Britain and other Western nations alone must resolve it. Since this line fits that hitherto taken by the African countries chiefly concerned, it is the more likely that the Russians will adhere to it. The Soviet Union's present

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position on the side-lines has enabled her as an anti-imperialist power to exploit it fully for propaganda purposes. She will not move towards closer involvement without the certainty of clear political advantage.

Enforcement of sanctions against Rhodesia by limited naval/air blockade

10. It seems probable that if the United Nations resolves upon a programme of mandatory sanctions, such action alone will not bring to an end white minority rule in Rhodesia, since there are likely to be significant breaches of the sanctions, particularly by South Africa. The question of enforcement action against Rhodesia is therefore likely to lead to enforcement action against South Africa. In the unlikely event, however, that a proposal for the limited enforcement of sanctions through a naval/air blockade of Mozambique ports alone is carried through the General Assembly or the Security Council, Soviet attitudes will in the first instance be affected by the manner in which this is done: if "illegally" by the Assembly, the Russians could decline any financial or material obligation; if "legally" by the Security Council and in response to concerted African pressure, the Soviet Union might consider making a token contribution should they judge that failure to do so would expose them to odium in African eyes.

11. Alternatively the Soviet Government might see advantage in promoting participation by one or more Communist or pro-Communist countries in whatever force is raised (see paragraph 4 above) by which means the Russians would avoid compromising their position, and gain the say in political and operational control of the operation which would be one of their objectives.

12. However, the Russians will probably doubt that even enforced sanctions will have any decisive effect on Rhodesia, and considering the grave consequences of Soviet involvement in an operation which could, and probably would, escalate into a comprehensive blockade action against South Africa, would seek to limit such involvement severely if they could not avoid it altogether. Even if they had voted for the action, they would still be able to exploit the provisions of Article 43 of the Charter concerning agreements to provide forces in order to avoid supplying forces themselves.

Enforcement by comprehensive blockade of Southern Africa

13. The more likely proposal to impose sanctions against South Africa as well as Mozambique accompanied or immediately followed by demands for enforcement action would raise even greater problems at the United

UK EYES ONLY

Nations. Enforcement would entail a blockade of South Africa, whose shipping would necessarily be intercepted. We assume that the Western powers, or at least Britain, would veto the proposal in the Security Council and, if it were successfully taken to the Assembly, would refuse to participate. The Soviet interest would be to ensure that full blame rested with the West. But they would face a choice between accepting the West's veto and acquiescing, if no more, in what they have hitherto regarded as an illegal action by the Assembly. We do not think it likely that the Soviet Union would wish to shoulder the main responsibility for mounting such an operation or for its financing. Since any Soviet participation would probably involve the latter, it seems probable that the Soviet Union would accept the Western veto and take no further action. But in these circumstances African pressure could make the Russians change their position on Assembly authorisation. If they did, they might see political advantage in offering a limited contribution of ships and land-based aircraft for enforcement action against South Africa and Mozambique. They might also encourage other Warsaw Pact countries and the UAR to contribute in varying degrees.

Direct Military Action Against Rhodesia

14. The Soviet Union's reaction to a call at the United Nations for direct military action against Rhodesia would be governed by the same considerations as her reactions to a call for the enforcement of sanctions. She would endeavour to avoid becoming involved but might under African pressure agree to make some contribution to a United Nations force. We stand by the assessment in JIC(65) 73 that in such an event the Soviet Union would be unlikely to provide combat troops, but might provide some logistic support and air transport on a considerable scale.

IMPLICATIONS

15. We now examine the consequences of Russian and other participation in United Nations action on the lines described above.

Reactions of the Black African States

16. A majority of Black African states would welcome a Russian or East European contribution to a United Nations force designed to enforce sanctions by blockade. Exceptions would be Malawi, Botswana and Lesotho who would themselves suffer from any blockade, whether or not the Soviet Union or East European communist states participated. Reactions to the

UK EYES ONLY

provision of Russian or East European logistic or air transport support for a United Nations force set up for direct military action against Rhodesia would also, with certain reservations, be generally favourable except perhaps in the case of Kenya. Those states, including Zambia and Tanzania, on whose territory the force was assembled would however be acutely apprehensive should communist support entail the presence of any sizeable contingents of communist troops. But in the context of a United Nations resolution these states would feel it impossible to deny their co-operation and full public support. The African states might well expect a greater contribution towards United Nations blockading action than the Russians would be willing to make. However the Soviet Government would probably calculate that African displeasure would largely rub off on the West, particularly Britain, and that the Soviet Union would be excused for any failure of United Nations action resulting from inadequate support, since in African eyes the problems of Rhodesia and Southern Africa have been created by the West and are therefore for the West to solve.

Reactions of White Southern Africa

17. Russian or indeed any communist contribution to a United Nations blockade of Rhodesia would further stiffen the resistance of the Europeans in Rhodesia (who would in any case react strongly to any United Nations enforcement action) and ensure their complete commitment in support of the minority regime. If the Russians or other communist states made their contribution to a force blockading South Africa and Mozambique also, South African and Portuguese solidarity with the Europeans in Rhodesia and Rhodesian access to South African stockpiles would be assured. Should the Russians or East Europeans give logistic support and air transport for a United Nations force intended to invade Rhodesia, European reactions throughout Southern Africa would be intense and the South African Government would be likely to give a military guarantee to the Rhodesian regime.

Consequences for the Soviet Union

18. Compared to the West the Russians have more to gain and less to lose whether they give some support to or hold aloof from ~~the~~ United Nations enforcement action in Southern Africa. In addition should any Western nation feel compelled to veto a United Nations resolution on this subject the Russians by contrast could expect to gain considerable propaganda advantage and, an increase of influence in Africa.

UK EYES ONLY

19. The provision by the Russians of logistic and air transport support for direct United Nations action against Rhodesia, or a limited contribution to United Nations blockading action would greatly enhance the Soviet Union's influence in Africa. Moreover the sort of contributions which we assess the Soviet Government might make would not be sufficient to provoke serious African unease except in host states. Conversely a Russian failure to go at least some way to meet African demands for the use of force or a blockade would not damage Soviet interests to the extent that Western interests would be damaged by Western non-compliance.

Consequences for Britain and the West

20. Any offer by the Russians, or to a lesser extent, the East European communist countries, to participate in any United Nations enforcement action would result in greatly increased demands from all genuinely non-aligned nations for adequate Western participation. Should the Russians or the East European communist states take part in any United Nations enforcement action to which Britain and the West made no contribution, Western and particularly British influence in Africa and in the United Nations would suffer a disastrous set-back. The Soviet Union would also make some gain in terms of fresh opportunities for subversion so long as communist contingents remained in Africa.

CONCLUSIONS

21. We conclude that -

- (a) the Soviet Union is capable of providing sufficient ground and air forces, with logistic backing, for a successful invasion of Rhodesia;
- (b) the Soviet Union could also easily provide a force to blockade Mozambique and could make a major contribution to a naval/air blockade of Southern Africa, which might even by itself be a sufficient deterrent to potential blockade runners;
- (c) ~~however~~, the Soviet Union will make every endeavour to avoid participation in the enforcement of sanctions or direct military operations against Rhodesia, but ~~that~~

**SECRET**

UK EYES ONLY

under strong African pressure she might reluctantly agree to make a limited contribution in either case or persuade her allies and friends to do so;

(d) Soviet participation in United Nations action would enhance the Soviet Union's standing in black Africa and would stiffen the resistance of white Southern Africa. Failure to meet African demands will not damage Soviet interests to the extent that similar failure by Western nations will damage their position, given the coincidence of Soviet and African views that the West must bear full responsibility for resolving the Rhodesian problem.

UK EYES ONLY

Appendix to JIC 1007/66 (Final)

MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND HER CLIENT  
STATES IN THE CONTEXT OF UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS  
AGAINST RHODESIA

ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS

The enforcement of sanctions against Rhodesia by a naval/air blockade would involve covering all ports of entry in South Africa and Mozambique, but it would not be necessary to blockade Angola. It is assumed that such ports and airfields as exist in black Africa, and the necessary transit facilities, would be made available to a United Nations force.

2. It was calculated in OPD(65) 48 in the context of sanctions against South Africa that, if Portugal did not participate in these sanctions and a blockade of South Africa had to be extended to cover Angola and Mozambique, a total force of fourteen aircraft carriers and sixty frigates would be required to provide enough ships and aircraft on station to maintain a full naval and air blockade. The cost of operating the naval side of such a blockade was estimated at £134 million a year.

3. However although a force of this order might be needed to give a reasonable chance of 100 per cent interception, much would depend on the action approved against blockade runners. If the latter, with the backing of their flag states, were liable to confiscation of their ships and cargoes, a much lower chance of interception might prove a sufficient deterrent. In such circumstances a force of as few as twenty frigates might be able to carry out a blockade of South Africa and Mozambique, which would be greatly facilitated if land-based air reconnaissance was also available.

4. An effective United Nations "navicert" shipping control system would also help to reduce the size of blockading force required to about this level, but it would take time to set up the necessary organisation.

Soviet Ability to take part in a blockade

5. The full force given in paragraph 2 above would certainly be beyond the capability of the Soviet Union to provide either on her own or with the assistance of Soviet bloc maritime nations. The Soviet Union would however be perfectly capable of contributing to a joint United Nations blockading force both frigates and support ships, or indeed of finding the whole of a more

UK EYES ONLY

limited force, together with the necessary afloat support. Although they have no aircraft carriers they could deploy sufficient BEAR long-range maritime patrol aircraft to cover the whole of the South African and Mozambique coasts. In addition they could use airfields in Malagasy and at Dar-es-Salaam, which are suitable for operating BADGERS, to cover the Mozambique Channel as far south as Durban.

Possible Contributions from Client States to a blockading force

6. The only countries under Soviet influence which might contribute to a United Nations blockading force are Poland, Bulgaria and the UAR. Neither Poland nor Bulgaria possesses long-range maritime patrol aircraft, and it is thought that the Egyptians are not capable of operating their BADGERS in this role.

7. Poland might be able to contribute two to three destroyers/destroyer escorts, Bulgaria two, and the UAR up to four, together with one frigate and one fleet minesweeper. None of these countries would be able to provide the necessary afloat support, and they would therefore be dependent on ports or afloat support from some other country, presumably the Soviet Union.

8. None of these navies are trained for sustained operations outside their home waters, and their participation on more than a token scale is considered unlikely. In addition it is considered that the UAR would be most reluctant to spare her ships while tension with Israel persists.

UNITED NATIONS MILITARY ACTION AGAINST RHODESIA

9. To deal effectively with the Rhodesian Army on the ground, we consider that the United Nations would need a minimum of at least twice that of the Rhodesians e.g. about 20,000 strong. Furthermore these would have to be of like calibre. Because of the difficulties of access into Zambia, the United Nations force would need to be mainly air-portable as only one poor road is available through Tanzania and Zambia.

10. As a yardstick, fighting troops of the order of two Russian airborne divisions each 7,000 strong would be needed, or eighteen battalions in six British type brigades, each with supporting arms and administrative services. Additional administrative support units would be needed to set up base facilities. In addition bomber, fighter ground attack and some air defence capability for United Nations airfields and an assortment of light transport aircraft and helicopters would be needed.

UK EYES ONLY

11. It is however arguable that the white Rhodesians could be forced to submit by air action alone. This would involve "taking out" the Rhodesian Air Force, followed by selective bombing on a graduated scale of severity of targets such as communications and industrial installations. Such a programme would require a United Nations air force on a similar scale to that needed to support an invasion of Rhodesia, but the requirement for ground forces and the logistic difficulties would be much reduced.

12. No United Nations force of this magnitude could be raised without logistic support from the United States, the Soviet Union or Britain. There is now no likelihood of any effective contribution from African countries, and any United Nations force would have to be found from the more developed Western or Communist nations. The elements required would be -

- (a) fighting troops amounting to some eighteen battalions organised in air-portable brigade groups, though considerably less if the concept at paragraph 11 above were adopted;
- (b) administrative support units, to provide minimum base facilities, totalling about 8,000 men;
- (c) the bomber, fighter/ground attack, air defence, air transport and light aircraft and helicopters;
- (d) the air lift capability to mount and maintain the force.

Soviet Ability to provide an intervention force

13. The Soviet Union has the capability of providing all the above elements herself. The only military argument against participating in such a force would be fear of reducing Soviet capabilities to meet a general war situation. Short of a Soviet assessment that such a situation was approaching the question of Soviet participation would be decided upon political rather than military grounds.

Possible Contributions from Client States to an intervention force

14. Ground Forces. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary all have relatively large and efficient armies, but they are for the most part trained and equipped for armoured warfare in Europe. We therefore consider that the most likely contribution from the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries for a United Nations operation against Rhodesia would be one weak Polish airborne division, and two Czech airborne brigades. These would not have the necessary airlift either for operations in an airborne role or even for transporting themselves to Africa.

UK EYES ONLY

15. The UAR could in theory furnish a parachute battalion and a commando, both with the necessary airlift, but we consider that they would be very reluctant to do so.

16. Air Forces. The Warsaw Pact allies of the Soviet Union could all in theory make significant contributions to the air element of a United Nations force. They would be dependent on some other country for transport support for the movement of ground crews, ground equipment, spare parts and ammunition. But more important still they are not trained for such long-range deployment and we doubt whether they are at present operationally capable of contributing on more than a token scale, relying on Soviet logistic backing.

17. The UAR could contribute a number of AN-12 transport aircraft.

-(4)-

UK EYES ONLY

## EXTRACT from J.I.C. (66) 10th MEETING held on 1.12.66.

CONFIDENTIAL

11. POSSIBILITY AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROVISION  
BY THE SOVIET UNION OF FORCES FOR UNITED NATIONS  
USE AGAINST RHODESIA OR FOR THE ENFORCEMENT  
OF SANCTIONS

325/1  
219/2

The Committee had before them a draft JIC Note (JIC 1007/66) on the above subject, prepared by the Joint Intelligence Staff at the urgent request of the Foreign Office as a result of a meeting on 21st November of Ministers concerned with Rhodesia. The note reviewed material contained in JIC 817/65 and JIC(65)73 on this subject and also covered the possible enforcement of a blockade of Southern Africa.

THE CHAIRMAN said that the commission for this Note must clearly be accepted. The draft had suffered from the speed of preparation which had been required and from the consequent lack of departmental consultation. He thought it did not in its present form really answer the question and that it should be condensed, and re-written to cover -

- (i) Soviet military capability
- (ii) The likelihood of the Soviet Government participating in the forms of action envisaged in the Note
- (iii) The implications of (ii) above.

of their East European allies, or another country such as the UAR, to take part.

The Committee -

- (1) Instructed the Chairman, Joint Intelligence Staff, in consultation with Departments as necessary, to revise the draft as indicated above.
- (2) Instructed the Secretary to circulate the revised draft Note for clearance out of Committee as soon as possible.
- (3) Instructed the Secretary, subject to (2) above, to issue the Note to JIC(Limited) circulation and to seek the authority of the Secretary of the Cabinet to circulate it to Ministers concerned with Rhodesia.

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**UK EYES ONLY**

In discussion the point was made that section (ii) should cover the alternative possibility of the Soviet Union inducing one of their East European allies, or another country such as the UAR, to take part.

The Committee -

- (1) Instructed the Chairman, Joint Intelligence Staff, in consultation with Departments as necessary, to revise the draft as indicated above.
- (2) Instructed the Secretary to circulate the revised draft Note for clearance out of Committee as soon as possible.
- (3) Instructed the Secretary, subject to (2) above, to issue the Note to JIC(Limited) circulation and to seek the authority of the Secretary of the Cabinet to circulate it to Ministers concerned with Rhodesia.

**SECRET**

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JIC 1007/66

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CABINET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

POSSIBILITY AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROVISION BY THE  
SOVIET UNION OF FORCES FOR UNITED NATIONS USE AGAINST  
RHODESIA OR FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS

I attach a draft JIC Note on the above subject. It has been prepared by the Joint Intelligence Staff at the urgent request of the Foreign Office for the information of Ministers concerned with Rhodesia.

2. The draft has been placed on the agenda of the Joint Intelligence Committee for their meeting on THURSDAY, 1st DECEMBER, 1966 (as Item 6).

3. Departments are requested to telephone any comments to the Chairman, Joint Intelligence Staff (Ext. 348 or 232) as soon as possible on WEDNESDAY, 30th NOVEMBER for consolidation before the meeting.

(Signed) J.P. FOSTER

for Secretary,  
Joint Intelligence Committee

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

29th November 1966.

DISTRIBUTION

JIC  
JIS ('B' Team)

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

UK EYES ONLY

Annex to JIC 1007/66

THE POSSIBILITY AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROVISION BY THE  
SOVIET UNION OF FORCES FOR UNITED NATIONS USE AGAINST  
RHODESIA OR FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS

Draft Note by the Joint Intelligence Committee

In this note we examine the question above with special reference to Russian participation in the enforcement of the United Nations sanctions policy.

2. In JIC 817/65 we examined the willingness and capability of the Soviet Union to intervene unilaterally against Rhodesia, and considered that the Soviet Union would only contemplate action in conjunction with other forces under United Nations auspices.

3. In JIC(65) 73 we assessed that in the event of concerted military action against Rhodesia by the United Nations, the Soviet Union would be unlikely to provide combat troops, but this would not exclude the provision of some logistic support and air transport on a considerable scale.

4. We still consider these judgments valid in the context of direct action against Rhodesia but recapitulate below the principal reasons for arriving at them.

SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES

5. The Soviet Union would not be able to provide the whole naval/air force needed for a complete blockade of Southern Africa, mainly due to lack of aircraft carriers. She could however provide a major contribution of ships and land-based aircraft to such a force. A force of the size the Soviet Union could provide, though not guaranteeing interception, might in itself be sufficient to deter blockade runners.

6. The Soviet Union, with or without assistance from satellite countries, could provide sufficient ground troops, air forces and logistic backing for an invasion of Rhodesia.

7. Further details of Soviet military capabilities in this context are at Appendix.

8. The Soviet Union has in the past been reluctant to participate in peace-keeping or other action by the United Nations. The Soviet has hitherto never shown any wish to participate in a United Nations force, among other reasons because the deployment of Soviet armed forces outside communist territory would raise political difficulties and the Russians would wish to avoid setting a precedent. Furthermore they would be most unwilling to surrender command of their national forces, though we believe the problem might be less acute for their naval forces. Moreover, the spectacle of overt collaboration with the armed forces of the West would certainly invite the Chinese claim that this validated their accusations of collusion between the Soviet and the USA; such a charge would be difficult to counter and would be particularly unwelcome at the present juncture.

9. There are further reasons for Soviet reluctance to get involved in the Rhodesian situation. First, the Soviet Union has hitherto profited greatly from her avoidance of direct involvement. This has enabled her to castigate "imperialist" mishandling and alleged covert support of the Smith regime; the longer she can maintain this posture the better. Secondly, compared with such problems as Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet quarrel, Rhodesia is relatively unimportant and not urgent. As a source of propaganda it is a godsend; and there is no immediate Soviet interest that would be satisfied by a closer identification with the problem, at least until African governments make specific and unanimous demands on her. Thirdly, the Soviet Union can best demonstrate her claim that full responsibility for the situation lies with the West by insisting that the West alone should resolve it.

10. However we consider it probable that, the United Nations will at some stage resolve upon the enforcement of sanctions against Rhodesia by naval/air blockade. Mounting pressures to apply these sanctions to South Africa and Mozambique could also eventually be successful unless vetoed in the Security Council. Since these measures could not be implemented in either case without the full co-operation of the major powers, the Soviet Union like the Western powers would come under strong pressure to take action.

11. Bearing in mind the fundamental Russian reluctance to become involved in the Rhodesian situation we believe that the Russians will have the following criteria in mind in deciding whether or not to offer forces for United Nations action against Rhodesia -

- (a) the probable effectiveness of the action contemplated;
- (b) the attitude of the Western powers, in particular Britain, USA and France;

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UK EYES ONLY

- (c) the attitude of the black African countries;
- (d) Soviet capability to meet the demands made on her.

12. The Soviet Union will be careful to avoid commitment to any course of action which in her assessment was not completely assured of success. We cannot predict with absolute certainty her assessment of the likely effect of a naval enforcement of selective sanctions against Rhodesia, or of a similar enforcement of sanctions against South Africa and Mozambique, but in the light of the effect hitherto on Rhodesia of voluntary sanctions she will probably conclude that Rhodesia and a future South Africa could survive for some years against even stiffer sanctions than are at present contemplated against Rhodesia. She would also judge that the enforcement of a blockade is unlikely in itself to bring about the end of white-minority rule in Rhodesia which if achieved with the Soviet Union's help would enhance the latter's prestige and influence in Africa. In the unlikely event of the Soviet Union assessing that United Nations action on these lines would be effective, she might see advantage in limited participation. Reasons are given below for a Soviet decision to offer a contribution to a United Nations force, but to make a substantial commitment would run counter to traditional Soviet caution in international affairs.

13. The Russians must be aware of the size of British and American investment stakes in South Africa (£1,000 million and £250 million respectively) and will probably bank on the extreme reluctance of both to become involved in an economic confrontation with the Republic. Moreover the Russians have benefited from their championship of 'anti-colonialism' and in order to live up to their image might well feel impelled to make at least some token gesture in response to the appeals of independent black African countries for assistance in bringing down the white minority regime in Rhodesia. Failure to do so might cause them embarrassment or expose them to charges of bad faith.

14. There is therefore just a possibility that they might play for a quick propaganda advantage by initially offering naval and air support for the enforcement of sanctions against Southern Africa as a whole. Such an offer would almost certainly be made in the expectation that it would either provoke a veto by Western countries including France in the Security Council, or could otherwise be given only token implementation on the plea that lack of Western support made it impossible to divert Russian forces from their normal tasks of safe-guarding the Soviet Union. Should the Russians provoke a British or American veto they would have secured a notable success in their struggle to obtain influence in Black Africa at Western and Chinese expense should their

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action provoke reluctant western compliance with the United Nations blockade they might calculate that this would also serve their aims by inflicting considerable economic damage, particularly on Britain.

Direct action against Rhodesia

15. The foregoing analysis deals primarily with enforcement action by the United Nations. Taking the criteria at paragraph 9 above, it seems probable that in the Soviet judgment direct military action against Rhodesia could be successful providing adequate forces could be raised and this would in theory be an argument in favour of Soviet participation.

16. The case for Russian participation would moreover be even stronger if the Western nations had either dragged their feet in implementing a United Nations resolution on these lines or had unsuccessfully obstructed it: the propaganda advantages would be compellingly attractive. Moreover in these circumstances African opinion would be eager for practical results and would expect the Soviet Union like other Great Powers to give positive support to the resolution; failure to participate would put the Soviet Union in a bad light but not to the same extent as any Western non-complier.

17. As mentioned in paragraph 3 above, and for reasons given subsequently, we would not expect the Soviet Union in these circumstances to go beyond limited logistic support for United Nations military action, or to provide combat troops. By such a gesture they would avoid the odium of non-compliance but would not have committed themselves deeply in an operation which might well run into difficulties subsequently.

IMPLICATIONS

18. The conjunction of Western and African attitudes appears to place the USSR in a strong tactical position, in that the West is unlikely to meet wholeheartedly African calls either for economic sanctions against Southern Africa or for the use of force against Rhodesia, whereas the Communists world has consistently sympathised with the Africans' cause. This favoured position could however prove to some extent an embarrassment to the Soviet Union in that it would raise African expectations of positive support and run counter to her anxiety to avoid the necessity of taking unilateral action in the United Nations context.

19. There is also the danger that should the Russians give an initially favourable response to African sponsored United Nations demands and later not implement their undertakings in practice, their credit in Africa would suffer. They might calculate that African displeasure would rub off on the West,

UK EYES ONLY

particularly Britain, and that the Soviet Government would be excused in African eyes for the failure of a blockade. In the longer term, failure would however prejudice the Soviet Union's standing in Africa because African disillusion would tend to express itself through increasing rejection of all outside influences, whether Eastern or Western, although African disillusionment with the West is likely to be greater than their disenchantment with the Soviet Union since in African eyes the problems of Rhodesia and Southern Africa were created by the West and are therefore the West's responsibility to solve.

CONCLUSIONS

20. We conclude that -

- (a) the Soviet Union is capable of providing sufficient ground and air forces with logistic backing for a successful invasion of Rhodesia;
- (b) although she could not provide sufficient forces for a complete naval/air blockade of the whole of Southern Africa, she could provide a major contribution to a United Nations force in the form of ships and land-based aircraft for this purpose, and the forces thus provided might by themselves be sufficient to deter blockade-running;
- (c) the Soviet Union has never participated in a United Nations force, and there are important political difficulties involved in doing so;
- (d) participation in a naval blockade would present fewer difficulties than that in a land-force, but the Soviet Union would still be uneasy about placing Soviet naval forces under United Nations Command;
- (e) the Rhodesian problem is not of immediate importance to the Soviet Union and no major Soviet interest is involved. Only if a clear and assured advantage presented itself would the Soviet Union abandon its hitherto successful posture of anti-imperialist but non-involved sympathy for the African cause;
- (f) in the event of concerted military action against Rhodesia by the United Nations, the Soviet Union would be unlikely to provide combat troops but this would not exclude the provision of some logistic support and air-transport on a considerable scale;

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- (g) should the United Nations resolve upon the enforcement of sanctions either against Rhodesia or against South Africa and Mozambique also, the Soviet Union like the Western powers would come under strong African pressure to make a valid contribution. Banking on Western reluctance to embark on economic confrontation against South Africa, the Soviet Union might see advantage in making an initial offer to participate, in order to force the Western hand either by provoking a Western veto or securing reluctant compliance by Western countries. She would expect in practice to make no more than a token contribution;
- (h) the Soviet Union is in a strong tactical position. Participation in United Nations action will enhance her already strong position with the African nations, and failure to go at least some way to meet African demands will not damage Soviet interests to the extent that similar failure by Western nations will damage their position;
- (j) whatever the pressures for Soviet co-operation from African countries, we expect the Russians to react with extreme caution to any request for the commitment of Soviet man-power and, materials. She will at all costs avoid unilateral action under United Nations auspices, even in circumstances in which Western nations refused to comply with United Nations resolutions.

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UK EYES ONLY

Appendix to JIC 1007/66

SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF  
UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS AGAINST RHODESIA

Enforcement of Sanctions

The enforcement of sanctions against Rhodesia by a naval/air blockade would involve covering all ports of entry in South Africa and Mozambique, but it would not be necessary to blockade Angola.

2. A very considerable force would be required. It was calculated in OPD(65) 48 in the context of sanctions against South Africa that if Portugal did not participate in these sanctions and a blockade of South Africa had to be extended to cover Angola and Mozambique that a total force of fourteen aircraft carriers and sixty frigates would be required to provide enough ships and aircraft on station to maintain a full naval and air blockade. The cost of operating the naval side of such a blockade was estimated at £134 million a year.

3. However although a force of this order might be needed to give a reasonable chance of 100 per cent interception, much would depend on the action approved against blockade runners. If the latter, with the backing of their flag states, risked confiscation of their ships and cargoes, a much lower chance of interception might prove a sufficient deterrent. In such circumstances a force of as few as twenty frigates with land-based air reconnaissance backing might be able to carry out a blockade of South Africa and Mozambique.

4. An effective "navicert" shipping control system would considerably reduce the size of blockading force required but it would take time to set up the necessary organisation.

5. The full force given in paragraph 2 above would certainly be beyond the capability of the Soviet Union to provide either on her own or with the assistance of Soviet bloc maritime nations. The Soviet Union would however be perfectly capable of contributing to a joint United Nations blockading force both frigates and support ships such as ocean-going tugs, or indeed of finding the whole of a more limited force. Although they have no aircraft carriers they could deploy sufficient aircraft to patrol the Mozambique Channel as far south as Durban. For this they could use airfields in Malagasy and at Dar-es-Salaam and Mombasa which are suitable for operating Badgers.

6. Naval forces which are equipped for maintaining themselves at sea away from base for many months on end could without difficulty be withdrawn from the Soviet Mediterranean fleet, and in the event of United Nations blockading force being formed we assume that there would be no difficulty about shore facilities for the Soviet element of the force at East African ports.

-(1)-

UK EYES ONLY

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7. The only military argument against participating in such a force would be fear of reducing Soviet capabilities to meet a general war situation. Short of a Soviet assessment that such a situation was approaching the question of Soviet participation would be decided upon political rather than military grounds.

United Nations Military Action against Rhodesia

8. To deal effectively with the Rhodesian Army on the ground, we consider that the United Nations would need a minimum of at least twice that of the Rhodesians e.g. about 20,000 strong. Furthermore these would have to be of like calibre. Because of the difficulties of access into Zambia, the United Nations force would need to be mainly air-portable as only one poor road is available through Tanzania and Zambia.

9. As a yardstick, fighting troops of the order of two Russian or East European airborne divisions each 7,000 strong would be needed, or eighteen battalions in six British type brigades, each with supporting arms and administrative services. Additional administrative support units would be needed to set up base facilities. In addition bomber, fighter ground attack and some air defence capability for United Nations airfields and an assortment of light transport aircraft and helicopters would be needed.

10. It is however arguable that the white Rhodesians could be forced to submit by air action alone. This would involve "taking out" the Rhodesian Air Force, followed by selective bombing on a graduated scale of severity of targets such as communications and industrial installations. Such a programme would require a United Nations air force on a similar scale to that needed to support an invasion of Rhodesia, but the requirement for ground forces and the logistic difficulties would be much reduced.

11. No United Nations force of this magnitude could be raised without logistic support from the United States, the Soviet Union or Britain. To have any chance of success a United Nations force would require the support of a modern air force and effective ground troops. There is now no likelihood of any effective contribution from African countries, and any United Nations force would have to be found from the more developed Western or Communist nations. The elements required would be -

- (a) fighting troops amounting to some eighteen battalions organised in air-portable brigade groups, though considerably less if the concept at paragraph 10 above were adopted;

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- (b) administrative support units, both to provide minimum base facilities totalling about 8,000 men;
- (c) the bomber, fighter/ground attack, air defence, air transport and light aircraft and helicopters;
- (d) the air lift capability to mount and maintain the force.

The Soviet Union has the capability of providing all these elements herself. Alternatively, if encouraged by the Soviet Union to do so, Poland and Czechoslovakia could provide (a) and (b) and some of (c) above and the Soviet Union the balance of (c) and all of (d).

-(3)-

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The Secretariat

S/for J. J. D. have read  
attached  
objection  
not J. J.

Distribution of TIC papers to  
other countries is in concern of  
TIC, except in so far as  
Security considerations might govern  
it.

However the passage I have  
underlined is such unbelievable  
"doubletalk" that I would be  
very doubtful of the validity of  
this argument. Far from being  
"unable to stop the activities of  
Freedom fighters" the Tanzanian  
Government have been actively  
encouraging them, and providing  
training facilities at Government  
expense.

Bunyoro 13/9



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70

COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE

DOWNING STREET  
LONDON S.W.1

Whitehall 2323

Your reference:

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12 SEP 1966 (1)

J. I. C.

9 September, 1966

copy ~~permitted~~ 325/1  
Mr. ~~Belgium~~ 13/9  
" 69 P.C. and " Team  
B Team ~~and~~ See

A/1249  
A/C/TS

Dear Hamilton,

Please refer to your Memorandum JIC 748/66 of 30 August in which you requested comments on the proposed distribution of paper JIC(66)41 to NATO Governments.

2. As we informed you over the telephone, we are opposed to the proposal that the paper should be given this wider circulation.

3. Perhaps you would have a look at the following passages in the report viz: paragraph 9 (final sentence), paragraph 15 (last three lines), paragraph 20 and paragraph 21 (final sentence). We consider that it would be unwise to provide the Portuguese (as members of NATO) with information about Tanzania: relations between these two countries are already strained and we shall not contribute to the stability of Africa by providing one country with ammunition against another. You will recall that since the United States Government adopted the policy of legitimate retaliation as self-defence in the Gulf of Tonkin in the Autumn of 1964, the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Dr. Nogueira, has regularly referred to the similarity of subversive infiltration into South Vietnam and Mozambique and has drawn attention to the possibility of the Portuguese Government adopting a similar policy of legitimate retaliation against Tanzania. The British Government have never thought that there was any substance in Dr. Nogueira's threats, but we know that the Tanzanians have taken them very seriously indeed. All the same, the Tanzanian authorities have not felt able to stop the activities of freedom fighters (FRELIMO) within the Tanzanian border, nor have they felt able to refrain from accepting Chinese and Russian arms for these freedom fighters. In recent months the FRELIMO threat in North Western Mozambique has had to be taken more seriously by the Portuguese and it is impossible to be certain that the Portuguese will forever rule out the possibility of striking at the FRELIMO bases within Tanzania as some of them are so close to their border.

4. It is also worth recalling that for these reasons we have refrained from handing over at the six monthly meetings of NATO African experts material of this nature in the narrow Tanzania/Portuguese context.

5. We have considered whether the paper could be handed over with the necessary amendments being made to the offending paragraphs referred to above. I believe, however, that the Foreign Office have pointed out in discussion obvious objections to handing over a paper in which substantial excisions have been made:

/the

W. E. Hamilton, Esq.,  
Cabinet Office.

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- 2 -

the Portuguese could hardly fail to note the absence of references to Chinese activities in Tanzania and to comment thereon. We also would not be in favour of this course.

6. For all these reasons we consider, therefore, that it would be unwise to provide the Portuguese (as members of NATO) with information about Tanzania and we accordingly recommend that paper JIC(66)41 should not be circulated at the next meeting of the Information Committee.

7. I am sending a copy to Mervyn Brown in W.C.A.D., Foreign Office.

*yours ever  
Michael Shea*

(Michael Shea)

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SIP

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JIC 748/66

COPY NO. 55

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325/1.

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

SOVIET BLOC AND CHINESE PENETRATION OF AFRICA -

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

(Previous Reference: JIC(66) 33rd Meeting, Item 1)

68

The United Kingdom Delegation, NATO has suggested that as the above report would be of interest to other NATO Governments besides the USA and Canada who have already seen it, the JIC should authorise copies of the report to be circulated at the next meeting of the Information Committee.

2. Departments are requested to examine this proposal and to forward their comments together with any amendments they would wish incorporated if further circulation of the report is approved, to reach the Secretary (Ext. 139) by 5.00 p.m. on MONDAY, 5th SEPTEMBER, 1966.

(Signed) W.E. HAMILTON

for Secretary,  
Joint Intelligence Committee

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

30th August, 1966.

DISTRIBUTION

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Chairman, JIS  
JIS ('B' Team)

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JIC0103C

FOREIGN OFFICE,

68

S.W.1.

26 August, 1966.

P.C.

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Ted,



The U.K. Delegation to NATO has written to suggest that JIC(66)41(Final) -Soviet bloc and Chinese penetration of Africa: recent developments and future prospects - would be of interest to other NATO Governments besides those who have already seen it (the U.S.A. and Canada), and seeking the JIC's authority to pass it to them at the next meeting of the Information Committee. 3251

2. Would you kindly seek the views of JIC departments on this proposal.

Yours,

Humphrey

(H.J.H. Maud)

W/Cdr. Hamilton,  
JIC Secretariat,  
Cabinet Office.

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J 325/1

SECRET

MR. W.K. RICHARDSON

CABINET OFFICE  
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18 AUG 1966  
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I attach Sir Burke Trend's copy of JIC(66) 41 (Final), "Soviet Bloc and Chinese Penetration of Africa: Recent Developments and Future Prospects".

2. The report concludes that although recent setbacks and growing African suspicion are likely to lead the Soviet Union, but perhaps not the Chinese, to adopt a more cautious approach, the Communist powers will continue to exploit racial and anti-colonialist emotions in efforts to supplant Western political and economic influence. The Russians have been able to operate on a larger scale than the Chinese in providing economic aid, but competition from the Chinese may increase with China's industrial growth and competition with the Russians in supplying military aid may be intensified more rapidly.

3. I recommend that I be authorised to pass this report to the Prime Minister, the Foreign, Defence, Commonwealth and Colonial Secretaries and - on a personal basis - to the Minister for Overseas Development. The Joint Intelligence Committee have arranged for the report to be shown to Mr. Arnold Smith of the Commonwealth Secretariat in accordance with the procedure approved by the Prime Minister.

*F.B. Richards.*

(F.B. RICHARDS)

17th August, 1966

*M. Rogers*

I have retained Sir B. Trend's copy. To approve distribution

I think we should also go to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the 1<sup>st</sup> Secretary to the Commonwealth, as Mr. Richards for now.

*PR, 18/8. W.K.*

18/8

JIC Closes

~~Pl. now distribute as directed by Mr. Rogers~~

*Circulated  
19/8/66*

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*18/8*

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J 329/1  
J 329/2

MR. P.W. RUSSELL,  
DISPENSARY TERRITORIES DIVISION,  
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Copy to:- JIS ('B' Team)

Please refer to my minute J 329/2 to Martin Rogers about showing JIC reports to the Bechuanaland Prime Minister.

3. The Foreign Office and Commonwealth Office have both expressed agreement with the views expressed in my letter. I expect that you will now wish to write to Lloyd at Gaberones, saying that, for the reasons given in my minute under reference, political departments do not think it advisable to show JIC(66) 23 (Final) to Seretse Khama, but that he might wish to show him a sanitised version of JIC(66) 41 (Final) which will be reaching Gaberones in the next couple of weeks and which should need much less radical alteration.

3. If Lloyd thinks this is a good idea perhaps you would have a preliminary read of JIC(66) 41 (Final) and pass a list of suggested emendations to the JIS 'B' Team. We should then circulate it to Departments for approval.

JF

(J.P. FOSTER)

11th August, 1966

**SECRET**

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**SECRET**1. SOVIET BLOC AND CHINESE PENETRATION OF AFRICA:  
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

(Previous reference: JIC(65) 21st Meeting, Item 4)

3251.

The Committee had before them a draft report prepared by the Joint Intelligence Staff on the above subject (JIC(66) 41 (Draft)).

Introducing the report, MR. CRICK said that it was an updating of a similar paper issued in May 1965 which was of rather wider scope in that it covered the interests and activities of other countries such as Yugoslavia, the UAR, Algeria and Cuba, in the area. The new report confined itself to Soviet Bloc and Chinese influence in sub-Saharan Africa; to the progress achieved and the setbacks which both had suffered over the past fifteen months; and to their prospects for the future. While we might derive satisfaction from Communist misfortunes, there were no grounds for complacency: neither the Russians nor the Chinese had relaxed their efforts in Africa. Both had increased the volume of their broadcasting, and there was still plenty of anti-colonialist emotion for them to exploit. Both the Soviet Union and China had perhaps learnt something about the dangers of excessive meddling in the national affairs of African countries and of African reluctance to substitute one "colonial" master for another.

In discussion the point was made that from a political and source point of view, there was no objection to the report being seen by the Secretary General of the Commonwealth Secretariat in accordance with previously agreed procedure.

The Committee -

- (1) Instructed the Chairman, Joint Intelligence Staff, in consultation with the Commonwealth Office and Defence Intelligence Staff to redraft paragraphs 13 and 15 of the report in the light of their discussion.
- (2) Subject to (1) above, approved the report as amended in discussion.
- (3) Approved the proposed distribution list subject to the inclusion of the Governors of Mauritius and the Seychelles, and instructed the Secretary to issue the report accordingly.
- (4) Agreed that the report should be seen by the Secretary General of the Commonwealth Secretariat, and instructed the Secretary to inform the Canadian J.I.C. representative of their agreement.

F.R.

J 325/1

**SECRET**

MR. W.K. REID

(S)

CABINET OFFICE	
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I attach Sir Burke Trend's copy of JIC(65) 85 (Final) "Chinese Influence in the Middle East and North Africa".

2. This report was produced in response to requests for a report on Chinese activities in the Middle East to match JIC(64) 73, which covered Chinese activities in Africa; Chinese influence in the Middle East had been examined, but only briefly, in 1963. The new paper includes a great deal of new information. Work on a parallel paper on both Soviet Bloc and Chinese penetration of the rest of Africa, comparing their successes and failures, is being put in hand shortly.

3. The conclusion of the present paper is that China has achieved very little success in her efforts to extend her influence in the Middle East (these, however, have been small compared with her efforts in Africa). Her principal Middle East efforts have been made in Algeria, the UAR, Iraq, Syria and the Yemen. Relations with the first two of these have shown a progressive deterioration; the Chinese have established some contact with the Palestine Liberation Organisation and with the Omani rebels, but only in Syria and, more particularly, in the Yemen have the Chinese achieved positive results. On balance any marked or rapid increase of Chinese influence in the area is unlikely.

4. I suggest that I be authorised to pass this report to the Foreign and Defence Secretaries. *plus Commonwealth Sec*

*F.B. Richards.*

(F.B. RICHARDS)

3rd May, 1966

*Mr Richards,*

*2 opn: but? add C'manic Sec.*

A/Sec 3:

*For necessary action, please*

*Enabled 4/5/66*

*(S)*

*FB*

*F/V.*

*S.*

*8/5.*

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JIC 389/66

COPY NO. 56

CAELNET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

SOVIET BLOC AND CHINESE PENETRATION OF AFRICA:  
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

A requirement has been expressed for an up-to-date report on Soviet Bloc and Chinese achievements and prospects in Africa.

2. The last JIC assessment of Soviet bloc and Chinese penetration of Africa was contained in JIC(65) 30 - "The Interests, Capabilities and Intentions in Africa of the Soviet Bloc, China, Yugoslavia, Cuba and the UAR and Algeria" dated 25th May, 1965; during the past year there have been fresh developments, such as the emergence of new military regimes which have tended to be hostile to communist influence.

3. Unless I hear to the contrary by 12 NOON on FRIDAY, 5th MAY, 1966 your agreement to the attached draft Terms of Reference will be assumed and they will be issued accordingly.

(Signed) J.P. FOSTER

for Secretary,  
Joint Intelligence Committee

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

2nd May, 1966

DISTRIBUTION

JIC  
JIS ('B' Team)

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Attachment to JIC 389/66

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JIC(66) (Terms of Reference)

COPY NO. 56

1966

CABINET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

SOVIET BLOC AND CHINESE PENETRATION OF AFRICA:  
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

Note by the Secretary

A report is required (JIC 389/66 refers) on Soviet Bloc and Chinese achievements and prospects in Africa. For the purposes of this report Africa is defined as sub-Saharan Africa together with the Somali Republic, Ethiopia and the Sudan.

2. The study should begin by describing briefly Soviet Bloc and Chinese fortunes and misfortunes in Africa during the past year and should then go on to examine their root causes and their probable effect on future Soviet Bloc and Chinese initiatives on a comparative basis.
3. Appendices should be attached in the form of up-dated versions of Annexes 'A' and 'B' to JIC(65)30 - "The Interests, Capabilities and Intentions in Africa of the Soviet Bloc, China, Yugoslavia, Cuba and the UAR and Algeria".
4. Departments are invited to send contributions to the Chairman, Joint Intelligence Staff by 5.00 p.m. on Thursday, 26th May.

(Signed)

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

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MEETING OF HER MAJESTY'S REPRESENTATIVES IN  
EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA  
LONDON, 17-21 MAY, 1965

Present:

Chairmen: Sir Saville Garner  
Sir Roger Allen  
Mr. J. Chadwick

Ministers: Mr. Cledwyn Hughes, Minister of State  
for Commonwealth Relations  
(Item 1 only)

Mr. George Thomson, Minister of State  
for Foreign Affairs  
(Item 6)

Heads of Missions:

Sir J. Russell (Addis Ababa)	Mr. R.W.D. Fowler (Dar es Salaam)
Mr. J.S. Bennett (Bujumbura)	Mr. R.C.C. Hunt (Kampala)
Mr. E.M. Rose (Leopoldville)	Mr. W.L.B. Monson (Lusaka)
Mr. B.H. Heddy (Lourenco Marques)	Mr. M. MacDonald (Nairobi)
	Mr. J.B. Johnston (Salisbury)
	Mr. D.L. Cole (Zomba)

Officials: Sir P. Gore-Booth  
Mr. C.M. Le Quesne  
Sir A. Cohen ) Ministry of Overseas  
Mr. R.B.M. King ) Development (Item 5)

together with officials from the Commonwealth Relations Office;  
Treasury; Ministry of Defence; Cabinet Office; British  
Council; Ministry of Overseas Development; Joint Intelligence  
Service; Central Office of Information,



MEETING OF HEADS OF MISSIONS IN EAST & CENTRAL AFRICA

17-21 May, 1965

Monday, 17 May: 3.00 p.m.

Item 1: British policy and objectives in Africa with special reference to East and Central Africa. The influence on the area of events in South Africa, Rhodesia, the Portuguese territories and the Congo.

Sir Saville Garner (in the Chair) opened the meeting by welcoming the Heads of Missions, meeting in this country for the first time as members of the new Diplomatic Service. He introduced Mr. Gledwyn Hughes, Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations, who spoke about the problems Britain faced in Africa at the present time. The Minister's speech is attached as an Annex to these minutes.

2. Sir Saville Garner thanked the Minister and invited comments on the many points that the Minister had raised.

3. Mr. MacDonald (Nairobi) thanked the Minister for his analysis of our problems in Africa. Our policy in countries south of the Sahara must be to keep them well-disposed to the West and especially to Britain, and to defeat the intentions of the Russians and Chinese. We did not wish to align African countries with the West against the East; we wanted them to be friendly to us without becoming involved in the Cold War. Our main aim must be to remove the root causes of economic and political discontent.

4. In Kenya, there had been a series of defeats for the Communists, and generally speaking there was no imminent danger of Communists gaining control anywhere in East and Central Africa. But the Communists, though discouraged by setbacks in Kenya, the Congo and elsewhere, must be expected to hit back hard and soon, and at Britain rather than the U.S.A. We would be attacked particularly on racial matters. Race was the paramount issue in Africa today, and on Rhodesia, the Portuguese Territories and South Africa Britain was vulnerable. Of all these problems that of Rhodesia was the most immediate. It was certainly true of Kenya that our best course was to decide what was legally and morally right and stick to it.

5. Sir Saville Garner asked whether the Communists appealed to Africans on material or on ideological grounds. Mr. MacDonald replied that in Kenya the moderates held the upper hand for the time being. Mr. Odinga and his colleagues were not Communists though they had Communist backing. He thought however that the use of bribery by the Communist countries to win political support was very dangerous. Mr. Fowler (Dar es Salaam) thought that though Tanzania was buffeted in the cross currents of African politics, the forces of moderation were still worth supporting. A great number of Britons still worked there and the moderates were not without a voice, despite constant pressure from the extremists. There had been a difficult period at the end of 1964 but the last few months had seen a great change. The offer of an 18 million

/rouble

rouble loan from Russia had very recently been turned down and there was already some disillusionment with the terms of the Chinese loan. Tanzanians still recognised the value of British aid, and were deeply concerned with development. The next three or four years would not be easy, especially if we failed to disassociate ourselves conspicuously from Portuguese policies in Africa. The Chinese would exploit this to the utmost. We should allow ourselves to reap the full benefit of our own enlightened policies. It would be a mistake to try to "isolate" Tanzania. The Tanzanian Government had entrusted the training of their Army, and now their Air Force, to the Canadians, which was a severe blow to the Russians and Chinese. It was probable that the Tanzanians would ask us to help them to form a Navy. There would be great advantages in having all the Tanzanian Armed Forces trained by Western experts, and despite Britain's current economic difficulties it was highly desirable that we should give them the necessary aid.

6. The Minister of State asked if the Portuguese Territories were a more important issue for Tanzania than was Rhodesia. Mr. Fowler replied that the Tanzanians had asked the Americans and the French to apply pressure to Portugal, possibly on the lines of the Chester Bowles' plan, and had pressed the British Government to bring diplomatic pressure to bear. On Rhodesia, however, they felt that a settlement was still negotiable, and had been content to let Britain handle the problem. Nyerere was basically sound; some of his Ministers were hostile to us, probably under the influence of Communist bribes.

7. Mr. Monson (Lusaka) said that at independence Zambia was rich, but depended for most of its revenue on non-African workers. Zambia's problem was to raise its backward agriculture to the level of efficiency of its extractive industries, to provide work for the unemployed from the mines and give a broader base to the economy. This would be a long and difficult task. As expatriates dominated Government Service and the running of the mines, there was much scope for discontent, which Communist propaganda could exploit. Political infection would spread from neighbouring countries.

8. President Kaunda and his Cabinet were therefore torn between their desire as African nationalists to keep in line with the O.A.U. and the economic necessity for development and for the maintenance of good relations with Portugal and South Africa. Despite their right-wing sympathies and their opposition to violence, the Zambians would continue to support the O.A.U. President Kaunda was not a dictator; he had rivals, and had to take account of the more leftward of his supporters. The expatriates were very necessary for the stability of Zambia and the stability of the country was very necessary if the expatriates were to stay. At present there was very little Communist activity; but the Communists would certainly cultivate the refugee and liberation bodies.

9. Sir Saville Garner asked how the Europeans in the Copperbelt were behaving. Mr. Monson replied that their roots were not deep in the country. There was no settler problem in Zambia and the Europeans had been reassured by the way Kaunda had pacified the troublesome youth groups. Fewer Europeans were now leaving Government Service and indeed the Zambians were having to pension some of them off in order to maintain the pace of their own Africanisation schemes.

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He thought that for the West to isolate Tanzania would be dangerous to Zambia. Tanzania was Zambia's only outlet to Black Africa. A Communist Tanzania could lead to a Communist Zambia

10. Mr. Johnston (Salisbury) reviewed the position in Rhodesia. Everything that had happened in Africa recently had made the White Rhodesians more right-wing in their views. Every example of injustice and mismanagement to the North was featured in the Rhodesian Press. The White Rhodesians were not so much racialists as afraid of rapid Africanisation. The future depended on how far we could impose our will on them. It was unthinkable that we should send British troops into Rhodesia and so the possibilities of manoeuvre were limited. If we forced them to declare independence unilaterally we could drive them to become a province of South Africa in a very short time. The alternative was to warn them of the consequences and at the same time offer the prospects of independence by negotiation. Mr. Smith and the majority of his supporters had realised what unilateral independence would entail. The Nationalists were divided and discredited, and no solution would be possible which gave them a constitutional veto. This meant that any solution which was possible would be opposed by the Nationalists. A solution which guaranteed progress towards universal franchise might be possible but it was doubtful if Mr. Smith was in a position to accept it. He would only take the risk of doing so if he were fully aware of the risks of a unilateral declaration of independence. The negotiations now starting would be long-drawn-out and would have to go in stages. There was perhaps one chance in twenty of a solution that would be acceptable both to Mr. Smith and to the other African countries. But there was a fair chance that unilateral independence could continue to be put off.

11. Mr. Monson said that President Kaunda was very cautious about expressing a view. He thought that if the British Prime Minister's five principles could be accepted by the Rhodesians then other Africans might accept them as the best solution possible. However, he doubted whether Mr. Smith would be able to carry his Cabinet with him. (Mr. Johnston confirmed that Mr. Smith was very conscious of this danger). President Kaunda feared that the situation might drag on without a solution, and that Britain would regard the mere avoidance of a u.d.i. as a victory. If this happened, the pressure on Britain would mount.

12. Sir Saville Garner, summarising, said that this was an agonising dilemma. At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting Mr. Wilson would probably still be in private negotiations with Mr. Smith. Would this satisfy other African Commonwealth Governments? There was only one chance in twenty of our being able to agree to any solution which Mr. Smith could accept, and five years was the very minimum period he would conceivably consider for the achievement of universal suffrage. Could such a solution be regarded as a victory for Britain? Or would pressures not immediately mount for further concessions? Was there also the danger that a Rhodesia given independence under these circumstances might be refused admission to the Commonwealth by the African members?

13. Mr. MacDonald said that there were many white settlers who now wanted to stay in Kenya, and who were annoyed at the stories of their ill-treatment which were current in Rhodesia. He suggested that visits of settlers between the two countries might

/be

be discreetly arranged in order to dispel Rhodesian fears. As for Kenya's attitude, two years ago the Kenyan leaders might have accepted a delay of 5-7 years in granting universal suffrage in Kenya. They could probably now agree to no more than 3 years. There was a chance that if we took what we thought was the right decision and stuck to it, the Kenyans might accept it. It would not matter fundamentally if an independent Rhodesia did not join the Commonwealth. But although President Kenyatta believed in negotiation, Kenya would expect us to impose a solution by force if negotiation broke down, and would accuse us of racial discrimination if we did not. Mr. Johnston said that Rhodesia was not greatly concerned about Commonwealth membership and would probably be content with a relationship with Britain similar to that of Eire. He stressed however that the African Nationalists in Rhodesia were dis-united, ill-lea, and incapable of taking over the government of a highly sophisticated country. We should insist on this to the African Commonwealth countries at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting, and make it plain that we could not impose their rule. It followed also that the Rhodesian Government would not accept a stipulation that Black rule must follow in a given period of years; and any such intention would have to be masked in the terms of any agreement. Mr. MacDonald said the Kenyans could probably go along with this, though they would probably express in public their own interpretation. They were moreover very conscious of the weakness of the African Nationalists in Rhodesia. But they were unlikely to accept that the use of force was impossible; and indeed we might be driven to some such measures in the last resort.

14. The Minister of State said that the use of force was only conceivable if Civil War broke out; or if we were asked by the Governor to intervene; or if President Kaunda asked us to take over the Kariba Dam to protect Zambia against a threat of economic strangulation by Rhodesia. But military intervention would be perilous and unpalatable. We might have to take a painful decision very soon, since continued drift might be intolerable. If so, we would have to stand by it even if it meant that Rhodesia would be excluded from the Commonwealth. Was a new constitutional conference out of the question?

15. Mr. Johnston recalled that Mr. Bottomley and Lord Gardiner had stated the position clearly to Nkomo and Sithole in Rhodesia earlier in the year. Britain had never put into power any Government which had not served a political apprenticeship; immediate universal suffrage was out of the question and there was no common ground for a new constitutional conference. They had probably absorbed this, and conveyed it to African nationalists elsewhere. From their point of view, a settlement reached without their participation might be the only way out of an impossible situation. Mr. Fowler said that the Tanzanians would be highly suspicious of Britain if we granted the Rhodesians independence before they achieved majority rule. Rhodesian membership of the Commonwealth would not be a major issue. Mr. Cole said that Dr. Banda would support any British move short of force or of anything which would put him under intolerable nationalist pressure. He would probably be content to see the status quo preserved for the time being.

16. Sir John Russell (Addis Ababa) felt that Rhodesia was seen in Africa not as a Commonwealth but as an African question. Africa was important because it controlled more than one-third of the votes in the U.N. and among these the wilder elements were the stronger. The O.A.U. was at present an important but totally unreasonable influence, and it was doubtful if the moderates such as Ethiopia, would be able to restrain the rest.

South Africa

17. Sir Roger Allen commented that South Africa had not been a burning issue recently. The Government were fully in control and were not afraid of subversion, and the economy was booming. Other African countries seemed increasingly to be accepting the situation in South Africa; would they eventually accept that in Rhodesia? However, the ex-High Commission Territories, which would all soon be independent, woul<sup>d</sup> prove troublesome as Britain was expected to see that they were equitably treated by South Africa. Attention would be drawn to South Africa by the decision of the International Court on South West Africa which was expected later in the year; the area was not vital to South Africa, but she would probably seek to drag out the legal argument. We should try to educate the independent African states on the realities of the situation in both Southern Africa and Rhodesia.

18. Two unfortunate aspects of the situation in South Africa were that no progress was being made in building up an African middle-class, and that the English South Africans were now aligning themselves increasingly with the Afrikaaners.

19. Mr. MacDonald thought that Rhodesia and the Portuguese Territories were more urgent and emotional issues than South Africa at present, but that the independent African states regarded South Africa as an important though less immediate problem. Kenya was looking to other African states to match Kenya's sacrifices in boycotting South African trade, and effective joint action was not likely to be easy or to improve inter-African relations. Sir Saville Garner thought that Britain would have trouble in ridding herself of the belief in Africa that she had a responsibility in the problem of South Africa. Mr. Bennett (Bujumbura) suggested that once there was a solution in Rhodesia, our difficulties over South Africa would increase.

The Portuguese Territories

20. Mr. MacDonald suggested that Britain should try to correct the impression that as Portugal's allies in N.A.T.O. we were also in sympathy with her in Africa. We should make it plainer that legally and morally we were on the side of the Black Africans against the Portuguese. To say that the Portuguese Territories should become independent but that the Portuguese should decide when majority rule should be introduced was regarded by Africans as self-contradictory as long as the Portuguese had clearly no intention of giving majority rule. The Minister of State wondered whether we could do anything to remedy this without the co-operation of the U.S.A. He enquired how the problem affected the complex of

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relationships between Zambia, Malawi and Rhodesia.

21. Mr. Cole said that Dr. Banda was very worried about the practical effect on Malawi of any movement for the liberation of Mozambique; he would not object however to our re-stating our views on Portuguese policy. Mr. Monson said that President Kaunda also felt that chaos would result if the Portuguese departed. If civil war broke out in Mozambique, the Chinese might well find a foothold there.

22. Mr. Heddle (Lourenco Marques) reviewed the credit side of the Portuguese account. Mozambique was not prosperous, but there was law and order there, Communism was rejected, and the Portuguese were actively educating the African population and building bridges and roads. The Portuguese attitude to racialism was much the same as our own. Was our attitude - and that of Tanzania - mainly dictated by tactics? Portugal would hesitate to support Mr. Smith, though they respected South Africa and condemned British policy as weak. They considered the tide had turned in their favour in the U.N., and would see no reason to make concessions. Mr. Johnston thought that the advantages of the Portuguese racial policy were cancelled out by the absence of any rule of law as we knew it in Mozambique. Mr. Rose wondered whether Portugal would seriously resent public attacks made on their policy by Britain for motives which they perfectly well understood. Although the Congo Government had given support to Holden Roberto, Portugal had not reacted strongly and Congo/Portuguese relations had been unobtrusively tolerant. The Congo Government would be reluctant to see disorder and civil war in Portuguese Africa. Mr. Monson said that Africans would never acquiesce in Portugal's view of the future of her territories. But the Portuguese had the ability and will to resist revolution.

23. Mr. Fowler said there was growing frustration in Tanzania on the subject of Mozambique. President Nyerere was afraid of Portuguese action, and of the pressure on him to accept arms from the Sino-Soviet bloc, thus exposing Tanzania to influences which he equally feared. By making our position clear on South Africa we had relieved ourselves of pressure on that issue. Could we afford to handicap ourselves by not making our position clear on Mozambique?

**SECRET**

Tuesday 18 May. 10.30 a.m.

Item 2: Movements towards African unity: in particular O.A.U., E.C.A. and regional co-operation movements in East Africa. Commonwealth influence in East Africa.

Mr. Chadwick took the chair.

24. Mr. Le Quesne introduced the topic. He said it was curious that political unity was so often assumed to be the natural state towards which things were working in Africa. However, the aspiration to unity which predated independence, was one of the basic factors in the African scene. After independence a number of false starts were made. In 1963 the organisation for African unity (OAU) was set up. For British interests it was in itself neither good nor bad. However, in as much as it could reduce the weakness and instability that resulted from the Balkanisation of Africa it was welcome. In spite of Mr. Diallo Telli's malign influence, the record of the OAU was not wholly negative. It had reduced the temperature of the Morocco-Algeria and Ethiopia-Somalia frontier disputes. Though it had tended for a time to fall into the hands of the extremists, it was now being more influenced by the more moderate West African leaders. The Congo crisis and in particular the Security Council debate of December 1964 appeared in retrospect to have been a watershed in African Affairs. It was certainly a turning point for the OAU. The extremists had initiated the debate as an assault on neo-colonialism. At a preparatory meeting the African powers had failed to agree on a common line and a split had emerged between the moderates and the extremists. The moderates, fearing to create a precedent dangerous for themselves, had accepted Tshombe as legitimate ruler of the Congo. This was the first time the moderates, in particular the Ivory Coast and Morocco, had stood up and opposed the extremists.

25. In February 1965 the OCAM had been set up at the Nouakchott meeting of all the former French territories except Guinea and Mali. At first the aim of the moderates had been to stand up for reasonable policies on the Congo. These aims were now extended to working not merely for recognition of Tshombe but actively for his reinforcement. An umbrella for aid to the Congo had been provided by the proposal that the Leopoldville Government should join the OCAM. OCAM had also tried to reduce the influence of Nkrumah and expose his support for subversive movements. OCAM members had threatened not to attend the proposed Accra meeting of the OAU unless Nkrumah expelled the refugee and subversive movements operating from Ghana. In general OCAM members aimed to resist attempts by the extremists to lead them into emotional and impracticable policies. A recent example of this new and surprising moderation had been the behaviour of the Ivory Coast in the controversy over Rhodesia; twice in five months OCAM countries had saved Britain from embarrassment in the Security Council.

26. Nigeria was in agreement with the specific aims of the OCAM members but believed that the setting up of the OCAM as a formal sub-group within the OAU was unnecessary and would weaken the OAU. The OCAM states denied this intention. The difference was one of intellectual approach rather than of basic intention; but the effect was that Nigeria was reluctant to give wholehearted support to OCAM; and the moderates' front was to some extent weakened. Nigeria and Ethiopia thought the OCAM was pushing Nkrumah too far. The September meeting of OAU was bound to be a rebuff for Nkrumah: if it were held in Accra, Presidents Senghor and Houphouet Boigny would certainly not attend; if it were not held in Accra this would be a rebuff to Nkrumah.

27. H.M.G.'s policy on African Unity was straightforward; we were in favour of African unity but genuinely neutral as to whether a separate OCAM group should exist within the OAU. That was an African problem. We should encourage the specific aims of the OCAM states, leaving it to them to settle the institutional problems. It was most unlikely that any form of effective African unity would be achieved in the foreseeable future. The longer the delay, the stronger the vested interests against unity would become; which Presidents would volunteer to become Vice-Presidents?

28. The drive for unity had deflected the efforts of the Africans from more practical tasks. By urging Continental unity (which hindered effective co-operation at a lower level) Nkrumah did more damage than by encouraging subversion. The Africans should now find some way to raise their living standards by co-operating in practical ways. There were two organizations which could play such a role:-

- (a) the E.C.A., whose Secretary, Mr. Gardiner, had urged that it should devote its attention to sub-regional development plans.
- (b) the African Development Bank which had hardly yet begun to operate. At its meeting in Khartoum, the Bank had decided, regrettably, to allow the financing of national as well as multinational projects. This decision was likely to make the Bank a battlefield for national rivalries instead of an organ for regional co-operation.

29. Mr. Le Quesne shared Sir John Russell's pessimism about the effectiveness of the Commonwealth; it merely gave its African members more scope for twisting our tails.

30. Mr. Chadwick put two questions;

- (i) would the moderates or the extremists win?
- (ii) would there be an increasing number of organizations in Africa and a development of regional co-operation?

31. Sir John Russell said he agreed with Mr. Le Quesne's statement that the OAU was neither good nor bad but thought its achievements had not been entirely negative. He accepted the overall view of African Unity as a laudable and even if it was not in the nature of things. He wondered whether we should encourage a connection between OCAM and Ethiopia on a non-organic but functional basis but he had not found the Ethiopian Prime Minister sympathetic to the idea, and Mr. Diallo Telli was meanwhile rallying opposition to OCAM rather successfully.

32. Mr. Rose said that the Congo (Leopoldville) Government were passive so far as African Unity was concerned. He thought OAU was likely to go through long periods of ineffectiveness. Its antagonism had made little impact in Leopoldville. It should be encouraged if only as an outlet for the extremists. He agreed that more restricted regional groupings like P.A.F.M.E.C.S.A. were valuable. M. Tombalbaye had suggested that the four Equatorial States should resolve the Brazzaville/Leopoldville dispute; there had also been a suggestion that Congo (Leopoldville) should become associated with OCAM and this should be encouraged. He would like also to encourage better relations between the Congo and the Anglophone countries of East Africa. M. Adoula had spoken a year before of a large central block made up of Kenya, Tanganyika, Zambia, Nigeria, Angola and the Congo between the extremists and the conservatives of U.A.M.

33. Even in the Congo, African unity was an ideal, especially among the youth. It existed alongside a xenophobic isolation which applied

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just as much to Africans as to Europeans. Perhaps this was because the Congo had never been part of a larger group, though he felt that M. Tshombe was opposed to any rapprochement on the grounds that the other African States had their eyes only on the Congo's wealth. We should try to break this barrier and integrate the Congo into Africa in order to give it more stability. Apart from our own investments, this was in our interest because of the expense of U.N. operations and the value of the Congo's raw materials. The Congo had little knowledge of what was going on outside its borders and M. Kasavubu saw no-one from the rest of Africa. We should encourage visits and perhaps also military help from, for example, Nigeria. Mr. Chadwick doubted whether Nigeria would be willing to do so except under the cover of an O.A.U. umbrella. Mr. Fowler said the Tanzanian Government would have welcomed an attempt by Mr. Kasavubu to start a dialogue, especially as President Nyerere was so emotionally embittered about Tshombe. Mr. Le Quesne pointed out that the Congolese Ambassador had not even been received though he represented Kasavubu and not Tshombe. Mr. Rose suggested that Nyerere send an envoy to Kasavubu.

34. Sir Roger Allen said that during his tour he had felt this complete failure of communication even between black Africans. The Congo was shut in on itself and the Anglophone and Francophone countries lived in separate compartments. The O.A.U. meetings were not an adequate substitute for continued diplomatic exchanges. We should not seek something dramatic like a Nyerere-Tshombe reconciliation but encourage a wider exchange of views in which the Heads of State communicated through wider diplomatic representation. Ethiopia might act as a bridge in this. Sir John Russell agreed that the colonial heritage of metropolitan air routes was the cause of the lack of lateral communications, but thought there was a prospect of inter-African co-operation over communications. Mr. Le Quesne said that this failure of communication exaggerated the importance of someone like Diallo Telli but pointed out that African diplomatic missions were not only small in numbers but low in calibre. Mr. Rose referred to the language difficulty. Mr. MacDonald congratulated Mr. Le Quesne on his lucid analysis though he felt that, on balance, the O.A.U. had done more good than harm. If the moderate countries in the O.A.U. were able to improve their position, immature resolutions on e.g. Rhodesia would not be of great importance. The O.A.U. was a very young organisation with inexperienced representatives, and had faced a difficult situation. The surprising thing was that it had not broken up and that it had had one or two achievements to its credit even in its very early days. Its resolution on respect for the old colonial boundaries had had a good effect. Despite appearances, it had made a useful contribution to the recent pacification of the Congo problem in that Tshombe had had an opportunity at the meeting in Nairobi in February of influencing and reconciling the African moderates. He thought that the influence of the moderates was increasing. Though the recent OCAM delegation had found Nyerere intractable, they had found support from Kenyatta for admitting Tshombe to OCAM as soon as possible. There was an urgent need for more diplomatic contact between the moderate or non-committed states. We should try to get the Francophone countries to open missions in Nairobi, as Nigeria was doing, and discreetly encourage contact between M. Tshombe and President Kenyatta. Anything possible should be done to remove M. Diallo Telli. The E.C.A.'s activities should be supported, though Mboya might prove more of a liability than an asset as Chairman. The tide seemed to have set against regional co-operation in East Africa and there was little we could do to stem it.

/Mr. Cole

Mr. Cole said that President Banda was regrettably isolated. We might be able to develop contact between him and Kenyatta, whom he admired. Nkrumah's influence on him seemed to be on the decline. Mr. MacDonald said that President Kenyatta would certainly regard him as an unrepresentative African leader. There was not much chance of contact unless Banda were to call at Nairobi. Mr. Cole made a plea for wider and prompter circulation of information on O.A.U. and OCAM activities, and Mr. Chadwick undertook to examine this.

35. Mr. Monson said that the Zambians were in favour of African unity, but their ideas were still rather vague and emotional. President Kaunda was opposed to the boycott of the Accra meeting of O.A.U., although he sympathised with the grievances of the OCAM states. Zambia was adopting a moderate line perforce, because of her economic dependence on Rhodesia and the Congo: Kaunda was apprehensive about the arms that Tshombe had picked up. Mr. Monson agreed that we should do what we could to strengthen the O.A.U. Zambia welcomed the E.C.A. sub-regional approach. The E.C.A. was to hold a meeting in September 1965 on industrial co-operation in East and Central Africa: the discussions would however be of limited use without Rhodesia. Zambia strongly supported the African Development Bank, particularly as a means of contributing to the financing of a railway link with Tanzania; President Kaunda wished to make this a joint project in order to keep the Chinese out. He planned to get the Bank's help for a joint survey. Zambia had been told that Britain had no money to finance the project; Mr. Cole suggested that a consortium could be formed instead. He agreed that Zambia's diplomatic links were poor; only three African states - Congo (Leopoldville), the U.A.R. and Ghana - had representatives resident there. The Nigerians would be the most welcome, and might be encouraged to appoint a High Commissioner at Lusaka.

36. Mr. Bennett said that both Ruanda and Burundi were very poor. Burundi had ceased to play an active part in the O.A.U. There was almost no commerce with Ruanda. Burundi sought closer economic links with East African organisations, and Ruanda closer links with Uganda through which its imports and exports passed. The hope for both countries lay in economic co-operation with East Africa; and the failure of co-operation between the East African countries would make Ruanda and Burundi a greater economic burden on Belgium. Failing such aid, the choice lay between ruin and Communism. Tanzania lay across Burundi's lifelines, as Uganda did across Ruanda's, and both Burundi and Ruanda should be encouraged to cultivate these neighbours. Canada was the Commonwealth country most active in Ruanda and Burundi. The Canadians had financed and staffed a French-speaking university in Ruanda and this was a way of bridging the Francophone/Anglophone gap. Canada might be encouraged to take over Commonwealth responsibility in Ruanda and Burundi from Britain. Mr. Chadwick said that a survey was being made of the Canadian effort in Africa, and this point would be taken into consideration.

37. Mr. Le Quesne, summarising, said that developments over the Congo had proved that the O.A.U. itself was an influence neither for good nor bad; it all depended on its leadership. It was hard to distinguish who were the "moderates" we should encourage; our aim should rather be to support moderate policies. He agreed that the lack of physical and diplomatic communication within Africa had had bad effects. But the incompetence of African diplomacy was a handicap: the African states were very

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short of people to man their diplomatic services. A bad ambassador could do more harm than no ambassador. Our technical assistance could help make good this deficiency. We should not encourage the extension of OCAM membership if this would lead to a widening of the gulf between OCAM and O.A.U. We must not overestimate our influence with the moderate countries; there were limits to what they could be expected to do. Yet the Congo and Rhodesia debates had shown that it was probably now too sweeping to say that on racial issues there were no moderates. Thus we need not despair of influencing the moderates provided that the policies we asked them to support were legally and morally defensible.

Wednesday 19 May: 10.30 a.m.  
Item 2 (continued)

Sir Roger Allen took the chair.

38. Mr. Chadwick opened with a statement on Commonwealth influence in East Africa. If the Africans had to choose between the Commonwealth and the OAU they would probably choose the latter, but it seemed that the present informal type of Commonwealth link was an advantage. Mboya had argued that an institutional Commonwealth might force the Africans to reject it in favour of the OAU. The African attitude to the Commonwealth was full of dichotomies: Nyerere, then considered a moderate, had on Tanzania's independence stated his support for the U.N., African unity, and the Commonwealth association, in that order. Yet it had been Nkrumah who had asked last year, to the surprise of his own delegation, for teeth in the shape of a Commonwealth Secretariat.

39. Commonwealth influence came probably more from outside Africa than inside, in that it let in light from the outside world. While it was hard to assess the significance of the Commonwealth inside Africa for Africans themselves, the Commonwealth link was at least meaningful as a series of special bilateral links between African countries and Britain. Here, the relationship was one in depth, allowing contacts at all levels in the country's life. Of Ghana, for instance, it could be said that Nkrumah no longer represented his country and that the people themselves probably retained a robust English view and would one day rise up and reject him.

40. Mr. Chadwick assessed the present benefits to Britain of the Commonwealth. It had given us advantages in African countries not enjoyed by others, a historical head start in our relationships, and unofficial links in many fields. The bilateral bonds had survived independence and the evidence was that it would pay us to continue to foster them. This would encourage Canada, India and Australia to provide support. Ghana and Tanzania were showing little return; but without these links they might be in a worse state. He defined our policy as relaxed patience, backed by unobtrusive aid and influence. Even if our over-all effort in Africa was reduced, he saw no grounds for shifting the overall balance in this effort South of the Sahara as between the Commonwealth and foreign countries. Sir Roger Allen said he would not decry the strength of the Commonwealth relationship, but asked whether more should be done to foster it, or whether we already did too much. It was a valuable relationship but should work both ways and the Africans should show understanding of our difficulties. Mr. Cole said we should distinguish between individual African countries and their relations with Britain, and the Commonwealth relationship in general. We had special obligations at all sorts of levels in Africa. In Ghana he thought the relationship between Ghanaians and the British people was what counted. In Malawi, he had found President Banda well disposed to the Commonwealth in the sense that he favoured its existence and valued his own visits to London; but the Commonwealth as such meant very little to him. In practice among neighbouring countries

/Zambia

Zambia, Tanzania and Uganda were not particularly well disposed to Malawi. Mr. Johnston thought we should get the time perspective right: we had now probably passed the peak of the tirade against colonialism and neo-colonialism. The Commonwealth had so far been of no assistance in the managing of political affairs between African governments, but it had great future potential especially in the context of the cold war and the struggle between the haves and have-nots. The Commonwealth was the biggest international "old boy net" ever and operated in every walk of life; at the lower echelons of leadership it provided innumerable points of entry. All these contacts would cease if the Commonwealth ceased to exist. We were fighting the cold war not with gunboats but with technical assistance and teachers of English. The Commonwealth was a real sentiment, and there was merit in erecting a chain of bridges between disparate countries. Even if these bridges were rickety they existed, and we should keep them in repair until present dangers had passed.

Mr. MacDonald agreed. Before the Commonwealth Prime Ministers conference of 1964 Kenyan leaders thought the Commonwealth was expiring: the conference had revived their faith. Kenyatta had been impressed by the usefulness of the discussions, and by what he regarded as a demonstration of a multiracial family of human beings treating one another as equals, and as a precursor of the brotherhood of man. Mr. MacDonald agreed with Sir R. Allen that the Commonwealth relationship should be a two-way exchange. The Commonwealth provided a better opportunity for contact in depth than did the United Nations. The Kenyans had faith in the Commonwealth and wanted to strengthen it in practical ways. However if there were a clash between the O.A.U. and the Commonwealth the Commonwealth would lose; but as long as there were no clash, both could make a useful contribution. The Rhodesian question would dominate the forthcoming Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference and it would be a crucial issue: it was regrettable that Vice-President Odinga would be leading the Kenyan team.

Mr. Monson was in general agreement with the previous speakers. Zambia believed that their African connections prevailed over their connections with the Commonwealth and the United Nations. There was some disillusionment with the Commonwealth among Zambians; they considered, for instance, the Malaysia problem to be irrelevant. They wanted to continue the use of English as the lingua franca and would sooner turn for assistance to other United Nations countries than to the U.S.A. The Rhodesia question would certainly be crucial at the forthcoming conference.

Mr. Fowler said that although Tanzania's connection with the U.K. was a short one, much had been done in 38 years. Tanzanians as individuals respected the Commonwealth, but in the short term regarded it as a pressure group through which to exercise their influence, especially on the Rhodesia issue. There were 1200 expatriate officials in Tanzania, the British business community dominated the economic scene, Tanzania sent her army officers to be trained in the U.K., and British university places were the most sought after. All this demonstrated the depth of our links with Tanzania. We should foster the Commonwealth connection while recognizing that Tanzania's contribution was not as yet likely to be very helpful.

Sir Roger Allen emphasized the distinction between the

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Commonwealth connection and the British connection, and the necessity for a two-way traffic in ideas. We should continue to try to persuade the African states to appreciate our difficulties over such issues as Rhodesia and Malaysia. But it was agreed that the Commonwealth should be cultivated as an investment for the future.

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Item 3

Means of counter-acting Communist activities  
in African states

41. Mr. Barker began by explaining that the Counter-Subversion Committee had no funds and no executive authority, but was a forum for exchanging and formulating ideas. He did not wish to go into Communist motives for their activities in Africa but, agreeing with Mr. MacDonald that the African was not a good subject for a conversion to Communism, he thought that the Russians motive in their own activities was a desire not to leave a clear field for neo-colonialism. He went on to examine the Russian and Chinese efforts in Africa. Russia's policy seemed more sober and responsible than China. Russia provided large scale economic aid, gave students a fairly wide education in Russia, set up news agencies and gave military aid to Government Departments. China, acting on Chou En Lai's thesis that Africa was ripe for Communism, sought to foster revolution against bourgeois nationalist governments on Marxist-Leninist principles. She provided military supplies for dissident elements, gave a military and ideological education to a few students, backed publicity to stimulate opposition to moderate governments and was so far implementing economic and technical aid only in Tanzania. He thought in the long run that the Russian method was probably more dangerous than the Chinese methods. But he would welcome comments from Commonwealth representatives. How much headway were the Chinese making? Were Russia and China likely to collide, conflict or undercut each other? He went on to outline the work of IRD, pointing out that briefs on particular subjects could be made available very quickly, that campaigns against individuals could be mounted and that IRD could finance visits that could not be financed under overt programmes. In particular he would welcome suggestions how to combat the subversive activities of the Communists and how to improve our methods.

42. Sir Roger Allen put three questions:

- (a) were the Chinese better than the Russians?
- (b) was any conflict between them, or between the Communists and the Arab Africans, inevitable?
- (c) Were the present arrangements for liaison satisfactory?

Mr. Rose said the Congo had certainly been the object of much subversive activity primarily from Brazzaville and Burundi but also indirectly by Ghana, the U.A.R. and Algeria. He thought that in all, this effort had been relatively small and unproductive and that the Congo which should have been an ideal target during the last nine months for Communist subversion had shown little evidence of direct Communist involvement in the rebellions. No outsiders had commanded or trained the rebels, there had been no left wing mercenaries nor even political advisers, and the rebellion had had little ideological content but had been rather a political struggle between the haves and have-nots.

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There had been a little training of leaders of the rebellion beforehand in China, some literature about general Communist ideology and simplified guerilla warfare, and a few explosives, but foreign arms had only begun to arrive in any quantity at the turn of the year. There had been no attempt to exploit Stanleyville, which the rebels had controlled for three months with an airfield and open frontiers. This was probably due to the insularity of the Congolese themselves.

43. On question (a) he thought the Chinese had played the larger role in the Congo, in a situation near to anarchy in which their methods paid off. In the long run however the Russians were probably the greater danger. He thought the only answer to subversion in a country with wide open frontiers and hostile neighbours like the Congo, was a regime commanding national confidence. In this sense, Russian activity in building up a class of young administrators devoted to them represented a real danger, and we should try to influence the young in the opposite direction.

44. There was scope in the Congo for using IRD information material which the newspapers and radio readily accepted. Even though this only reached a small number of people, these were the right people. He had no additional suggestions for adding to what we were already doing, but thought we should further English teaching and foster links with the East African Commonwealth countries. On the defensive side the Nigerians were helping the Congolese build up their police forces and the Israelis were advising on security; he thought the U.K. might provide advisers on guerilla warfare.

45. Mr. Bennett said that while we continued to be represented in Burundi most of our activity would be guided towards counter-subversion rather than political influence. The Chinese had won for themselves a considerable place in Burundi, preaching that Burundi could raise its standard of living by Chinese methods. At present H.M.G. gave no assistance to Rwanda or Burundi and such aid was necessary if we were to hold the situation stable. He expected the Chinese to return in the course of the year. They were still training Rwandan refugees in Nairobi, from where the ex-Mwami Kigeri still sent people to Peking for training. These refugees were awaiting return to Rwanda; the 100,000 in Burundi represented the chief threat, and 50,000 of these were potential bearers of arms. Those trained had taken an active part in the Eastern Congo with the rebels, and were willing to join any force that would assist them in returning to Rwanda.

46. The Mwami of Burundi who was the only stabilising force in the country had asked for our assistance in co-ordinating with the Belgians and the Germans a scheme to provide a radio network in Burundi. Under this, H.M.G. would provide transistors costing £5-7 thousand but the Ministry of Overseas Development were unwilling to participate. This was the only way we could play a useful part in assisting the Government, particularly while there were not enough teachers to send to Burundi. If Burundi had to continue without assistance, the former state of chaos would return.

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It would spread to Rwanda and from there to the Eastern Congo.

Sir Roger Allen said this was a gloomy picture which might prove expensive. Mr. MacDonald thought it would be useful if Mr. Bennett could go to Nairobi and discuss this with the Kenyan Ministers: the present moment would be very favourable. Mr. Hunt agreed that Kampala should be associated with this too.

47. Mr. Fowler said that Tanzania was a copy-book example of Sino-Soviet penetration. It was the home of the Liberation Committee and had influence on the subversive movements in the Congo, in the Portuguese territories and in South Africa. The Algerians had been an active link between Tanzania and the Stanleyville faction. Tanzania had a People's Republic inside the state: the Zanzibar revolution had developed internally as a result of Arab/African hostility, but during the revolution the Communists had established themselves in Zanzibar. It was hard to say which Communist country was the most firmly seated, but the Chinese made the biggest splash, the East Germans controlled many key positions and the Russians seemed to be biding their time but quietly gaining influence already. President Nyerere was a patient man and hoped that some moderate force would emerge in Zanzibar, and that Vice President Karume would manage to remove the more extreme elements from the Revolutionary Council. If he did, a tighter union with Tanganyika might be effected, leading to a more moderate non-aligned government. The recent decision to allow Zanzibaris into T.A.N.U., though it gave them a voice, might subject them to more reasonable influences, especially as the party was tightly disciplined. Mr. Fowler went on to examine the methods used by the Communists; he listed these as:

(a) state visits: Nyerere had felt obliged to visit Peking as the President of a non-aligned country who had already visited London and Washington. He had been impressed with the achievements, dedication and austerity of the Chinese, though not necessarily with Chinese ability to deliver material equipment. He was not now less non-aligned but he was convinced that China was a world power to be reckoned with and that Tanzania should keep in touch with her. Kawawa, a more impressionable person and a less acute observer, had been much more strongly swayed. His visit to Moscow to seek loans and defence equipment had been less successful; he had found the Russians less accommodating on loan terms and local contributions. Russian/Tanzanian relations seem to be a little less cordial and Tanzania was turning down Russian loan offers in particular because they were tied to Russian goods and technicians. In a comparison of British, Russian and Chinese aid done by the Minister of State in the Department of Economic Planning in Tanzania, British aid had appeared the most favourable, despite the high rate of interest, because of the suitability of the capital goods involved, the ease of negotiations and our willingness to contribute to local costs. Babu had a great admiration for the Chinese but was more difficult to assess and possibly represented a long-term threat. He was more intelligent than his Cabinet colleagues but had as yet no real political following in either Tanganyika or Zanzibar.

(b.)

(b) The second important Communist advantage was their readiness to identify themselves with African nationalism and to give wholehearted support to liberation movements south of Tanganyika.

(c) Economic aid and technical assistance were given even though Communist experts were in short supply. They were handicapped by language and the lack of an historical joint background. Mr. Fowler thought that the East Germans did best in Tanzania. The Chinese were more extrovert; the Russians more withdrawn.

(d) Bulk trade purchases of sisal and coffee helped the Tanzanian economy.

(e) Military training was given to the Peoples Liberation Army in Zanzibar though in Tanganyika the Canadians were providing army and air force training and all Tanganyikan officers still went to Sandhurst. The Russian training team which was about to leave had not overtly engaged in political activities though they might have done so covertly.

(f) The Communists controlled the "Nationalist" and the Swahili papers through Markham and the British Communist Kisch, who was at one stage due to be deported for the virulence of his anti-British articles but had since been appointed Public Relations Officer to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

(g) Subversion: one Minister had been bought with money from an unknown source, probably Chinese. The Chinese were seeking influence on key party members and perhaps their most damaging operation of all was their attempt to embitter Tanzanian relations with the West. The expulsion of two U.S. diplomats was almost certainly contrived by the Chinese in Zanzibar.

(h) Provision of arms in considerable quantities to the People's Liberation Army of Zanzibar and to Tanganyika, though the latter preferred British equipment and with Canadian encouragement were likely to adhere to British standards. There were far more arms in Tanzania than the armed forces required; and the surplus was likely to be available for subversive movements including FRELIMO. We should avoid pressing the Tanzanians to drop their relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc and should ourselves be ready with help. A number of Communist efforts had failed recently and this had reflected well on us. We should leave the Chinese to overplay their hand: the Tanzanians were unwilling to have the cold war brought within their borders. We should promote tours by trade unionists, and keep up the flow of experts, teachers, etc. The Tanzanians wanted our help: if we could relieve the pressure of racial questions, in five years we would see great progress.

48. In answer to a question by Mr. Le Quesne Mr. Fowler said that it was likely that the Russian and East German efforts in Zanzibar had been orchestrated, and that the Russians had encouraged East German activity in order to embarrass the West Germans. Sir Roger Allen commented that the security situation could not be good in view of the numerous arms dumps. Did Nyerere

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have control of these? Could we not stimulate him to ask for advice?

Mr. Fowler said that the dumps were the responsibility of the army and thus under the control of Sarakikya and Kawawa who were loyal to Nyerere. The Security Service was in a disquieting condition: it had been taken over by young politicians with the encouragement of the Israelis. It was divided into three sections, one working to Lusinde, one to Kambona and one responsible for security on the Congo border.

Mr. Bennett commented that the arms traffic to Burundi revealed gaps in Tanzanian security.

Mr. Fowler said there was no doubt that the Tanzanian Government approved of the supply of arms to rebel movements.

Sir Roger Allen asked if IRD could produce a paper on the security forces in Tanzania: could they, for example, be used by the Communists to get control of the country? Could such a paper then be used to warn Nyerere of the dangers?

Mr. Fowler said that these proposals would be of value.

Nyerere's control of the defence forces was effective, but the same could not be said of other fields.

Sir John Russell questioned our priorities: concentration on the Commonwealth might be misleading. There was a field in Ethiopia which we should be cultivating, but were not because of lack of staff and resources. We should be prepared for when the Emperor was no longer there.

Mr. MacDonald agreed that our effort in Ethiopia should be increased - provided there was no reduction elsewhere.

Mr. Le Quesne asked about the effect of the Russian rebuff in Kenya.

Mr. Cole said that it had made a healthy impression in Malawi. There was no immediate threat of subversion in Malawi, but it presented a tempting target in the long run. Banda was now 60 and had one rebellion on his hands. The exiled dissident ministers were getting money from the Chinese. FRELIMO were operating in Malawi and there must be a quantity of arms scattered about the country. President Banda had turned down an East German offer of aid and a Russian bid to establish an Embassy. The most serious danger was the assassination of Banda; there were people in Tanzania who had the will and the capability to bring this about. Banda was well alive to this danger. The British presence in Malawi was considerable and we could be seriously embarrassed if things went wrong.

Sir Roger Allen asked if we could not give Banda advice on security. Mr. Cole said that this should be considered.

49. Mr. Johnston said that in Rhodesia the Communists were using the Nationalists. Local Security concentrated on what the Africans thought about the Government rather than on individual Communists within the Nationalist movements; these were well penetrated by the security forces, who found that a certain amount of arms got through to Rhodesia from Communist sources. The connection between the Communists and the existing nationalist movements made it difficult for us to give any sympathy to the latter. Every discovery of a cache of Communist supplied arms strengthened the hand of the Rhodesian Government. To the best of our knowledge no white communists were overtly connected with the nationalist movements.

Wednesday 19 May: 4.15 p.m. Item 3: (contd)

50. Mr. MacDonald outlined Russia's activities in Kenya:-

- (a) An aid agreement of November 1964, for £16m. for industrial and agricultural projects.
- (b) A gift of 200-bed hospital and the non-capital elements of a technical college. Neither of these had yet been implemented: this failure had been compared unfavourably with Western aid.
- (c) Russia had granted 200 scholarships a year for Kenyan students.
- (d) there was considerable literary propaganda.
- (e) the Voice of Kenya and the Kenya News Agency had been penetrated. The Minister of Information, Oneko, was an Odinga supporter and fellow-traveller.
- (f) the Lumumba Institute was designed for the training of KANU party cadres. Its money and instructors were largely Russian. It engaged in straight political indoctrination.
- (g) individuals were bribed, particularly parliamentarians and trade unionists. It was important to remember that "you cannot buy an African: you can only rent him."

The main Chinese activities were as follows:-

- (a) An aid agreement for £5½m. and a gift of £1m. The failure to implement these had again caused resentment among Kenyans. It was possible that the Chinese (and the Russians) had not yet taken action on these agreements because they had expected by now to see Odinga in control of the new government and had hoped to boost him with the arrival of Communist aid. On the other hand red tape in Peking might have been responsible for the delay.
- (b) the New China News Agency operated in Kenya.
- (c) glossy and informative magazines were distributed.
- (d) the Chinese regarded money as their most important weapon and engaged in wholesale bribery.
- (e) Limited numbers of students were invited to China where they were given guerila training.

51. There were also Czech, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Polish and Yugoslav embassies in Kenya. The Ghanaians had supported this subversion: they had for example given money to the Lumumba institute.

52. The Communists had been giving help to the extremists in order to overthrow the government either by constitutional or by unconstitutional means. But neither the Russians nor the Chinese, who acted more in rivalry than in concert, knew how to handle the Africans. They might have made a mistake in choosing to support Odinga; it was likely that no Luo had a chance to succeed Kanyatta. Odinga had used Communist money with great skill, acting

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through Pinto, a clever and dedicated Communist. The Government had been twice defeated. Pinto's assassination in February had thrown the extremist movement into disarray. Odinga's nominees for the two seats left vacant by Pinto had been defeated by Kenyatta's supporters. Kenyatta had accepted an official definition of African Socialism which rejected Communism and to which Oneko and Odinga had been opposed. He had rejected a Russian arms gift and expelled the Russian instructors who had arrived with it. Finally Parliament had voted unanimously to have the Ministry of Education take over the Lumumba Institute. A private members' motion of no confidence in Oneko, aimed at clearing out the Communist sympathisers from the Ministry of Information, was waiting to be debated.

53. We had evidence that the Communists had been simultaneously plotting the overthrow of the government by unconstitutional means. Between March 1964 and February 1965 small quantities of illicit arms had reached Kenya from Communist countries. Kenyatta had not been fully informed about these, nor about the major shipment of Russian arms.. in April 1965. When he realised the scale and implications of the latter he had rejected it.

54. Similarly, students sent to E. Europe with Kenyatta's knowledge before Independence had been given military training and in spite of Odinga's efforts Kenyatta had refused the admission to the armed forces on their return. Some of those trained in Czechoslovakia had been instructed in the use of the type of tank included in the abortive Russian arms gift. The Communists, and Odinga, had expected all these students to be fifth columnists in the Kenyan Armed Forces; some had been told that Kenya would become a true Socialist Government and that they should take orders from Odinga.

55. Kenyatta now had the support of 16 out of 19 members of his Cabinet, (one member being uncertain) and a 2 to 1 majority of parliamentary back benchers. The Russians were likely to look in future not to Odinga but to Kaggia, an able and dangerous Kikuyu.

56. These developments had discredited the Communist Embassies in Kenya. Kenyatta was handling the situation shrewdly but after his own style. Recent events had given a model demonstration of how the Communists were at work on every front and perhaps they had thought Kenya the most important. It could well be Tanzania's turn next. The rivalry between Russia and China was to our advantage. Mr. Monson said that on independence in Zambia a large Communist intervention had been expected. It was a classic Marxist situation - an under-privileged proletariat, much discontent and unemployment, and Europeans in control of the economy. There had been Communist intervention even before independence in training students, who by now had attained some important positions. There was also some Communist attempt to infiltrate the middle ranks of the trade unions and the civil service.

57. This had not developed, however, as the Russian Embassy was concentrating on social contacts in the Party rather than in the Government, and on violent dissident groups in Zambia.

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The Chinese were operating in the lower ranks of the Party but were not well received. Both the Chinese and the Russians had social contacts with leading Cabinet members including Kamemba and Chimba. The Yugoslavs were very active but there were signs that their influence was receding. The present Ghanaian High Commissioner was friendly. The UAR Embassy was not playing a forceful role at the moment but was in a strong position because of Banda's personal liking for Nasser and the help which the Egyptians had offered before independence.

58. Kaunda's chief counter-action was directed against the trade unions. He had successfully attacked the trade unionists and won over their leaders at a private meeting and had appointed a loyal Registrar. Britain would be judged by the help we gave in the event of economic action over Rhodesia. The IRD representative in Lusaka was progressing well with teacher training but it was still necessary to reach the trade unionists, the youth leaders and the top politicians. On scholarships, the government had been refusing offers from the Communist Bloc with increasing difficulty. Few students had the requirements for British university courses though some appropriate courses were available at the University of York. The establishment of other missions in Lusaka would be useful; the Irish Republic and the three Scandinavian countries in particular were very popular.

Item 4: Information and Cultural Policy

59. Mr. Chadwick (in the Chair) and Sir Arthur Clark invited discussion round five principle themes:-

- (1) The level of information and cultural work and the techniques employed.
- (2) Training.
- (3) The importance of the B.B.C.
- (4) The scope for collaboration in a regional publication.
- (5) The applicability of the preference in the Plowden Report for information work directed toward specific policy objectives rather than generalised projection work.

60. In the course of the discussion the following main points were made:-

- (i) There was general agreement that cultivation of the English language throughout the area including Ethiopia, was desirable both by direct teaching and book presentations and the low-priced books schemes.
- (ii) Techniques:
  - (a) Films were considered by Mr. Fowler and Mr. Johnston to have very good educational value and deserved particular promotion in schools. Sir John Russell commented on their value among illiterate people.
  - (b) The meeting agreed with views expressed by Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Bennett that sponsored visits, whether for general or for training purposes, were a most useful element in information work.
  - (c) Mr. Bennett invited attention to the existence at one time of a fund, to be used in the discretion of the Regional Information Officer in Singapore, to pay for visits between different countries within the region. A similar arrangement would be of great value in Africa.
  - (d) The information value of B.I.S. newspapers published in Commonwealth countries was the subject of marked differences of opinion. Mr. MacDonald, expressing the view that it was difficult to avoid tactless mistakes, thought that the B.I.S. paper in Nairobi would probably cease publication shortly. He hoped that it might be possible to persuade the Kenya Government to stop similar Communist publications on a quid pro quo basis.

Mr. Fowler thought that a Swahili paper which it was proposed to publish in Dar es Salaam through B.I.S. was a good idea. The local press was extremely bad and a useful purpose might be served by such a publication. Mr. Hunt said the issue of a newspaper was a matter of "keeping up with the Jones's" in the information field and that in Kampala he would wish to continue the existing publication. Mr. Rose felt a useful purpose might be served by a Swahili paper in the Eastern Congo; he also thought it was important to supply sufficient material in French on British policies concerning Southern Africa.

(e) Mr. MacDonald agreed with Mr. Fowler that young people were an important information target.

(iii) Training:

(a) Press Attaches:

There was general agreement that attention should be given to the training of press attaches. It was noted that the Central Office of Information ran an Information Officers' Course in which such training took an important part.

(b) Journalists:

Mr. MacDonald reported favourably on the International Press Institute course in Nairobi. The meeting recognised that more training facilities were desirable, but was conscious that it was difficult to provide for the wide range of differing talent among candidates for courses in journalism in the different countries of the region. Mr. Monson suggested a "grass roots course" was needed. Mr. MacDonald emphasised that training should preferably be on the spot. Sir John Russell mentioned that there might now be a fortnight course in Addis Ababa.

(c) B.B.C.:

Mr. Fowler commented that B.B.C. training was very good. Mr. Monson thought more was needed.

(iv) B.B.C.:

Mr. Brooks Richards said that opinion in London favoured the construction of a medium-wave station on Aldabra. Sir A. Clark said this

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would provide a facility for broadcasting to mass audiences, where short-wave was only of use to broadcast to the 'influential few'. Mr. Johnston felt that short-wave broadcasts would certainly be insufficient for future information purposes; Mr. Fowler concurred.

(v) Collaboration between posts:

There was no general consensus on the desirability of a regional publication or on collaboration in processing and publishing existing B.I.S. material. Mr. Rose thought there might be scope for co-operation but Mr. Hunt, Mr. Monson and Mr. Fowler doubted this. Mr. Brooks Richards said the Foreign Office hoped that "Commonwealth Today" might be adapted to serve all Missions in Africa. (Mr. Bennett thought that a French edition would be useful.) While no conclusions had been reached the matter was under active consideration.

(vi) General Publicity:

Mr. Fowler said we should use films not indiscriminately in the bush, but in schools. Mr. MacDonald suggested we could dispense with "apple blossom". Mr. Monson argued against generalised publicity and said that much of it was inapplicable to our information needs in Zambia. Trade publicity needed to match the market; he instanced "apple blossom", the Quatercentenary of Shakespeare, and "700 years of Parliament", as being superfluous. Prestige publicity was not needed; we should rather publicise our technical assistance programmes and material of direct interest to Zambians. We needed to shape our information effort to fit the needs of people who were not highly sophisticated.

(vii) Level of Activity:

Sir John Russell commented that the marked disparity between the scale of Foreign Office and Commonwealth Relations Office information activities seemed hard to justify. A new assessment was needed with a view to reallocation of resources in the light of overall British objectives. Sir Arthur Clark agreed that there was this disparity and observed that the re-organisation of the information departments might progressively provide an opportunity for re-assessment on the lines suggested.

Item 5.

British Economic and Military Aid  
Programmes and Policies

61. Sir A. Cohen said that it would be convenient to discuss economic aid policies and programmes under the following headings:- (i) principles of aid; (ii) amount; (iii) terms; (iv) the problem of local costs; (v) technical assistance; and aid management; (vi) regional economic co-operation - the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa; (vii) co-operation with other donors.

62. The new Ministry of Overseas Development attached much importance to contact and understanding with posts abroad. He hoped to keep in close personal touch with Ambassadors and High Commissioners and would look forward to discussions with them when they came to London. When the new Ministry had settled down he hoped that he and his colleagues would be able to travel extensively in Africa.

Principles of Aid

63. Mr. King said that the Ministry was now in the process of reviewing future aid programmes. This review had reached an advanced stage; a draft paper had been circulated to departments and it was the intention to issue a White Paper later in the summer after Ministers had been consulted. The Ministry accepted that there was a strong political motivation in aid programmes, but their view was that economic development should be the prime object of aid policies, and they believed that in the long term the political gains of aid would depend on the economic development achieved. It was also the view of the Ministry that the British Government should enter into long-term commitments with recipient countries and that these long-term commitments should not as a general rule be disrupted on account of short-term political considerations. He had circulated to Heads of Missions Sir David Hunt's despatch on the question of aid principles, and a letter which he had written to Sir David Hunt commenting on the latter's ideas. Sir A. Cohen said that he wished to emphasise that he believed that long-term aid commitments should be disrupted only in the event of major political disturbance - e.g. Indonesia's 'confrontation' policy - and not on account of political disagreements of a minor nature. The Ministry were inclined to take a positive attitude towards aid giving. This attitude could cause controversy and would need delicate handling, but the Ministry did not believe in the alternative of sitting back and waiting for the recipient countries to make the running. The Foreign Office had now circulated a paper which on the whole sided with the views expressed by Mr. King, but which made it clear that the criteria for giving aid were still very much under consideration. The Foreign Office had put forward the view that a higher proportion of our aid should be given to those countries which could make the best use of it and that, by this criterion, a larger proportion should go to Asia and Latin-America and less to Africa. This view, and the dilemma it posed between our interests and our responsibilities, was still being debated.

64. Mr. MacDonald said that he did not regard the views expressed in the Hunt/King correspondence as being necessarily irreconcilable. He supported Sir David Hunt's view that it was most important to pay heed to what African Governments wanted, and

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that it might cause offence if we attempted to force our views upon them. In practice this kind of conflict rarely occurred; Embassies and High Commissions kept in very close touch with African Ministers and officials responsible for development programmes; we were able in this way to exert considerable influence on the thinking of the African governments with the result that in most cases they asked for the kind of help that we wanted to give. Mr. Fowler said that the procedure described by Mr. MacDonald had been applied with great success in negotiations with the Tanzania Government for the allocation to projects of our recent £7½ m. loan.

65. Sir A. Cohen agreed this kind of approach was right but it did not perhaps go quite far enough. The Prime Minister of Uganda had recently criticised our aid on the grounds that it was too ad hoc and haphazard. The Uganda Government were now preparing a second development plan, and they were proposing to bring us in at an early stage. The Uganda Prime Minister had welcomed a suggestion that the British Government should send a small administrative team to Uganda later in the year to examine the new development programme and to identify projects that might be financed by the British Government.

66. Mr. Cole said that Malawi provided an excellent example of the political importance of aid. At the time when we were negotiating our aid to Malawi, a reduction could have brought down the Banda regime. Now, of every £1 of recurrent expenditure by the Malawi Government, the British taxpayer was providing 8/-. One implication of this was that the British taxpayer was contributing 8/- in the £1 towards the cost of detention camps in Malawi.

67. Mr. Cole agreed that British aid should be spent on useful projects of which we approved. In Malawi, for example, it would be wrong to agree that British taxpayers' money should be used for such extravagances as the proposal to transfer the capital. Generous aid did not always generate goodwill; on the contrary, the very fact that a government relied on aid to survive could create acrimony and resentment. Even so, we undoubtedly did gain a great deal of credit through aid, and High Commissioners and Ambassadors should be given an opportunity of sharing in this credit. Our posts had many thankless duties to perform and it was important that they should also be associated with the more popular actions of the British Government, Malawi also raised the question of the direction of British aid. It seemed wrong that a country so backward, unimportant, and politically disreputable, should receive such a large share. Should it not be our long-term object to cut down our aid commitments in African countries? In the meantime, we were still absolutely committed to the current high level of aid.

68. Sir A. Cohen said that the Ministry must clearly work very closely with the C.R.O. and F.O. on the political aspects of aid. The Ministry would certainly bear in mind the point about High Commissioners and Ambassadors sharing in the goodwill generated by aid. As regards Malawi, there was an inescapable commitment, after the break-up of the Central African Federation, to prop up with massive aid whatever regime came to power. He agreed that we must try to cut down this commitment and, with this end in view, the Ministry proposed sending a mission to Malawi. It was unpalatable that we should be giving such large sums to a regime of which we might not approve and which might not last. Sir R. Allen (in the Chair) said that by cutting off aid

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one might topple the regime. Sir A. Cohen agreed that this was possible but that our aid would affect a new regime. Malawi was a special case. It was not necessarily the Ministry's intention to reduce commitments in other parts of Africa. For example, the scope of O.S.A.S. was being extended, and the Interim Report of the Stamp Mission to Kenya, which had just been received, would certainly not reduce our commitments in Kenya.

69. Mr. Rose said that we were giving very little aid to the Congo, and that, as a result, we might be shutting ourselves off from a valuable export market in what was potentially one of the richest countries in Africa. Before independence we had had a large economic stake in the country; British investment totalled £60 m. and our annual trade amounted to about £10 m. There had been a steady decline since independence; the United States had stepped in with economic aid and trade had followed. We had made two contributions to the United Nations' fund for the Congo and we were providing a certain amount of help bilaterally. However, the opportunity existed of exporting machinery to the Congo to a value many times that of the aid we were giving. By not taking this opportunity, British equipment in the plantations was being replaced by American or Belgian equipment and the export market was slipping away from us. Sir A. Cohen suggested that we could best keep our feet in the door by providing technical assistance either bilaterally or multilaterally. The Chairman said that the situation in the Congo raised the important principle as to how far aid should be used to prime the exports pump. Sir A. Cohen said that at the Council of World Tensions which he had recently attended in Kampala, African delegates had vigorously attacked the concept that aid and trade should go together. As he had said, the Overseas Development Ministry's main object was to promote development, but this did not mean that a certain amount of trade promotion could not be injected into the process.

70. Mr. Monson said that there was a considerable political element in the aid that we had agreed to give to Zambia, which was, by African standards, a rich country. He did not think that it would prove difficult to persuade the Zambians to use our aid for purposes that we thought right. We were in a position to exert considerable influence on the development thinking of the Zambians through the personal influence of Mr. Dudley Seers.

71. Sir J. Russell said that the background of Ethiopia was quite different from that of Commonwealth countries in East and Central Africa. We had few commitments and there were no British settlers. A £2 m. credit was outstanding, but he was not inclined to attempt to dictate the purposes for which the Ethiopians should use it. Our ability to do so was doubtful and our main object ought to be to promote exports of British goods and services. However, the question of aid for local costs had been raised in Ethiopia and he would be interested to know the Ministry's attitude to this problem. Sir A. Cohen said that the Ministry's view was that, as with Commonwealth countries, we should agree to our aid being used only for projects of which we approved. There was no question of dictation; we could achieve our ends quite simply by declining to provide finance for projects which did not appear to us to make sense.

72. Mr. King said that our first objective should be to get  
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the country concerned to prepare a viable development plan.

73. The Chairman asked why, if the prime purpose of our aid was to achieve economic development, there should be any distinction in our treatment of Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth countries. Mr. Cole said that budgetary aid was at the centre of the problem; if this kind of aid was withdrawn Malawi would collapse. Sir A. Cohen said that we had the major responsibility in Commonwealth countries and there was no indication - rather the contrary - that we should be able to transfer this responsibility to other donors. If we were to abandon a Commonwealth country the political effects would be deplorable. The Congo and Malawi could not be compared. In the case of Malawi the major responsibility was ours, while in the Congo, the major responsibility had been accepted by the Americans and the Belgians. Sir A. Cohen suggested that our aid to foreign countries would be more effective if it were more selective and concentrated. The Chairman agreed and said that the same approach should be adopted towards Commonwealth countries. Mr. MacDonald said that perhaps too high a proportion of our aid went to Commonwealth countries. But he would not agree that there should be no bias towards Commonwealth countries; the Commonwealth was a valuable influence in world affairs and should be fostered. Sir A. Cohen said that it was not true that aid to Commonwealth countries was undiscriminating; the bulk of our aid went to India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda; we gave comparatively little to Ghana, Sierra Leone, the Caribbean and Ceylon. Malawi and Malta were in a category of 'sick men' who had become so for historical reasons for which we were largely responsible, and we had no real choice but to continue to prop them up. Mr. Chadwick said that our aid should, as a general rule, be guided by our bread and butter interests.

74. Sir J. Russell asked whether it was the policy of the Ministry to compete with the Russians. Sir A. Cohen said that the Ministry hesitated to attempt to outbid the Russians, who were generally not very efficient in their aid giving. We should compete only by having efficient and properly thought out aid programmes.

75. The Chairman agreed with Mr. Chadwick. Many factors, including political factors, affected the direction of our aid. But generally we gave more to the larger Commonwealth countries because we had greater interests in those countries. The policy issues raised in this discussion were still very much under consideration in Whitehall.

Amount of Aid

76. Sir A. Cohen said that the Ministry needed a modest increase in funds in order to carry out new policies, and so were closely concerned with the Government's plans for public expenditure up to 1970. The objective was that overseas aid should be stepped up to 1% of G.N.P. over a period of five years. Ministers were anxious to increase the volume of aid, but the actual rate of increase would depend on our own economic position, and, in particular, on the effects of aid on the balance of payments; these effects were now being studied.

Terms of Aid

77. Sir A. Cohen said that he had been authorised to tell  
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Heads of Missions in strict confidence that Ministers had decided to soften the terms of aid. Development Loans would, in certain circumstances, be made interest-free and, in other cases, interest waivers would be extended. A proposal that there should be a third category of loans at concessionary rates of interest had not been acceptable. It had also been decided to soften, by means of a seven year interest waiver, the terms on which funds were to be made available to the C.D.C.; this would make it easier for the C.D.C. to participate in development corporations and agricultural small-holder schemes.

78. The Ministry had authority to discuss these new terms confidentially with other donors. It was expected that they would be welcomed by the Americans and the French, and would also create an opportunity to bring pressure to bear on the West Germans, and also possibly the Japanese, to soften the terms of their aid. It was intended to announce the changes in July before the O.E.C.D. meeting in Paris.

Local Costs

79. Mr. King said that it had been found that the East and Central African countries could not make full use of our aid if it were tied exclusively to British goods and services. We had, therefore, agreed to make available about sixty per cent of our aid to Kenya and about forty per cent of our aid to Uganda and Tanzania for local costs. Aid in this form added to our balance of payments difficulties, and there was the danger that the recipient countries would use the foreign exchange thus provided to finance imports from other donors. The Ministry were studying how to reduce this burden; in particular, consideration was being given to extracting a quid pro quo from recipients in the form of assurances that Government and also possibly private sector imports outside the development programme would be purchased in Britain. Any arrangement of this sort would of course have political implications. It was possible that aid for local costs would have to be increased if we wanted to expand our aid for educational and agricultural projects. It was clearly necessary to devise safeguards against the possibility of our paying for the local costs of a project for which other donors were providing the off-shore element. The Ministry intended to discuss this problem with other donors.

80. Sir A. Cohen said that the question of local costs was the biggest single issue raised at the recent Conference in Kampala. Nigerian and Ugandan delegates had been particularly critical of current aid policies in this respect. Mr. MacDonald said that local cost aid to Kenya had played an important part in building up the political strength and stability of President Kenyatta and his Government. The biggest danger had been a growing army of unemployed, vulnerable to subversion. Local cost aid had enabled the Kenya Government to find work for considerable numbers of unemployed and thus control unemployment. The consequent political stability was very much in our interest and it was to be hoped that the Ministry would continue to make available aid in this form.

81. Mr. Fowler said that British aid for local costs had been immensely valuable to the Tanzania Government. But the most

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important British help to Tanzania was the continued willingness of about a thousand British men and women to serve in that country. The work of these men and women, more than anything else, had prevented Tanzania sliding into chaos. At this distance in time from independence, the British people who continued to serve in Tanzania did so because they liked the country and wanted to stay on. However, there were difficulties which were causing wastage. There was discontent at the scale of assistance given by the British Government for children's passages, and complaints that the recent 12½% increase in O.S.A.S. allowances was being swallowed up by local taxation and rising living costs. There was also anxiety about future career prospects; expatriates could see that they would be needed in Tanzania for a few more years, but they were worried about their prospects after that. In view of the crucial contribution being made by British people serving in these countries, it would be well worthwhile for the British Government to give the comparatively small additional sums needed to keep people in good heart. As regards career prospects, would it not be possible to create a U.K.-based overseas service? Sir A. Cohen said that he agreed completely with the views expressed about the importance of O.S.A.S. Mrs. Castle believed that technical assistance of all kinds, multilateral and unilateral, including of course O.S.A.S., should have first priority. The complaints about the 12½% increase and the allowances for children's passages were fully appreciated by the Ministry. As regards career prospects, the Ministry were hoping to improve the position by expanding the home base in certain U.K. professions and services, so that a surplus would be available for service overseas. However, arrangements of this sort could not include doctors and teachers who were required in very large numbers in the African territories - these would continue to be supplied through O.S.A.S. It was also hoped to set up a small corps of home-based specialists; such a corps might well include administrators who were wanted for aid management and for the smaller colonies. But it was quite impractical to establish a home based service for all the people now serving under O.S.A.S.

Regional Co-operation

82. Sir A. Cohen said that Mrs. Castle was most anxious to promote regional economic co-operation in Africa and believed that we should give support to E.C.A. as an instrument for promoting this policy. The Ministry were, at the present time, supporting a request from E.C.A. that we should provide funds for a regional steel survey in East and Central Africa. Mrs. Castle was particularly anxious to help Zambia to integrate economically with the East African countries. The Heads of Missions were asked to give their views on the desirability of regional development and what part E.C.A. might play in such development. Mr. MacDonald said that we should support E.C.A. in every way we could. It was an African institution under an African director, Mr. Robert Gardner, and so would command political support from the African governments.

83. Mr. Bennett said that Burundi and Ruanda looked to E.C.A. for economic help and that hitherto E.C.A. had been able to provide more useful assistance than the U.N.T.A.B. experts who had not been a great success in those countries. Mr. Rose said that he supported the idea of regional development and that E.C.A. should have a major part to play in this development.

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One possible project which might engage the attentions of E.C.A. was the planning of an economic link between the Eastern Congo and East Africa. Mr. Monson said that E.C.A. activities were very much in line with the political thinking of the Zambian Government. Sir John Russell agreed that we should help it in principle; it was in a chaotic state but it could provide a useful counterweight to the wilder policies of O.A.U. Sir A. Cohen said that we should also lend our support, when appropriate, to other regional organisations such as the African Development Bank. We had agreed to give assistance to the Bank but this assistance was conditional on the Bank's producing projects of which we approved.

Co-operation with other donor countries

84. Sir A. Cohen said Mrs. Castle attached great importance to close co-operation with other donor countries, and that this co-ordination should be positive as well as mere passive avoidance of duplication and exchange of information. He went on to say that the I.B.R.D. were considering the setting up of aid consortia or consultative groups in Africa. Such groups were already in existence in Nigeria and Morocco; the intention was that the next one should be set up in East Africa.

Sir J. Russell asked about co-operation with the Americans.

Sir A. Cohen said that an attempt was being made to persuade the Americans to play a greater part in Africa in return for the greater effort that we were intending to make in Asia and South America. It was by no means certain that the Americans would respond, but the Governor Williams/Wayne Fredericks team in Washington might produce helpful results.

Military Aid

85. Mr. Chadwick said that a request from the Tanzanian Government for £300,000 to purchase military trucks from Britain had focussed attention on the problems of military aid to African countries. It had been most necessary to meet this request in order to fill the gap left by the withdrawal of West German military aid, and to tip the balance in favour of persuading the Canadians to help the Tanzanian Government to establish an air force. The Ministry of Overseas Development had been unwilling to agree that this money should be allocated from the aid that we were providing for economic development. It had, therefore, been necessary to refer the question to Ministers as a result of which the Prime Minister had directed that a global review should be made of policies guiding the supply of arms to other countries. From this review would emerge the criteria governing our military aid and the terms and purposes for which it should be given. The C.R.O. view was that military aid should have two main objects:-

- (1) to promote the efficiency of the armed forces in the countries concerned, thus ensuring stable political conditions;
- (2) to maintain our influence through the local forces, on the Government machines, thus protecting British interests generally; and to foster a modest export market;
- (3) to prevent an arms race in more sophisticated types of weapons.

86. As regards (2) we had already had useful talks with other donors, as a result of which the Israelis and the West Germans had agreed to provide arms and training to Commonwealth countries in Africa only when we had signified that we were not in a position to do so.

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A particular difficulty which had occurred was that some Governments required weapons of obsolescent types which were not now manufactured in Britain. It was becoming increasingly difficult to meet these requirements as stocks were run down. An attempt might be made to meet this problem by inducing, by a process of co-ordination, demands for the weapons in question sufficient to justify a continuation or resumption of manufacture in Britain.

87. Major General McNeill said that, as in the economic sphere technical assistance in the form of training facilities in Britain, and the secondment of British servicemen to Commonwealth Governments, was playing a most important part. There were between 600 and 700 Africans now in training in Britain, and about 1,000 British servicemen helping Commonwealth Governments. However, there was still need to clarify our ideas about the deployment of this kind of technical assistance between Commonwealth Governments.

88. Mr. Fowler said that he hoped that we would be able to respond to the Tanzanian request that we should help them to build up a small navy. If this could be done, it would have a most valuable effect on political stability and would help to sway the sympathies of the Tanzanians towards the West.

89. The Chairman said that experience showed that military aid was useful when given to friendly countries but ineffective when given to unfriendly Governments. There was an excellent opportunity in the Congo for British military aid to help to restore stable conditions.

Friday 21 May: 10.30 a.m.

Closing Session

90. Sir Saville Garner (in the Chair) opened the meeting by expressing his satisfaction with the talks and his hope that they would be repeated. It had been suggested that in view of the essential unity of African problems, future meetings should be attended by heads of all African posts if this proved possible. There were two major problems in modern Africa - the avoidance of exacerbating the East/West conflict and the dangers of mounting racial antagonisms. Both were aggravated by the existence of the white-dominated South. In Rhodesia we deserved more credit than we usually obtained. We had prevented unilateral independence; Mr. Smith was now ready to negotiate to avoid it; and we had made clear that we would act. The most difficult situation would be if we reached an unsatisfactory negotiated settlement, or the status quo dragged on. The use of force could only be envisaged on certain highly unlikely premises, and we should disillusion the Africans from their belief in its possibility. It was not feasible to alter Portugal's policies in East Africa while Dr. Salazar lived, but we would consider a further public re-statement of our position. In general we should work out policies which were legally and morally right and in accordance with our vital interests, and stand by them. He was gratified that our information policies appeared to be sound, and undertook to take up the suggestion for financing projects including medium wave broadcasts, possibly from Ascension Island, and facilities for the training of African journalists.

91. Sir Paul Gore-Booth made three points; first that he was determined to maintain the personal nature of contacts within the growing Diplomatic Service; secondly that we should regard Africa as a single problem and co-ordinate our policies accordingly; thirdly, we should not allow ourselves to be forced constantly on to the defensive or allow the vocabulary of virtue to be arrogated by our opponents. He hoped to visit Africa in the future.

92. Mr. MacDonald accepted that in the long term Europe and Asia were more important than Africa and that perspective was needed, for instance in the allocation of aid. But Africa had its own importance in both the short and the medium term. We had a positive interest in creating new and viable nations and a negative interest in frustrating in the next two or three years the vigorous but cynical intentions of the Communists to exploit the racial conflict against us. On Portugal's policies, he suggested that a fresh public statement might contain the following points:

93. African self rule accorded with the spirit of the modern age; at law it was solely Portugal's responsibility to determine how this should be achieved; time would be needed for the training of a future African Government; Britain should offer to assist the international community in this training; independence should be granted as soon as such training had been completed. On Rhodesia, the use of force should be envisaged in certain extreme circumstances, e.g. to protect the Kariba Dam, and we should tell the independent Africans in advance, in private if not in public, that we were prepared to go so far. On South Africa we should use both our present arguments at the United Nations in discussing the question of sanctions with African Governments, namely, that the charter did not call for sanctions and that we could not afford them.

/Africans

Africans respected the United Nations charter, and were realistic. Such steps as we could take without serious harm to ourselves, should be taken. In discussion it was pointed out that Commonwealth African countries had an interest in the state of the British economy, that if we boycotted South Africa its trade would go elsewhere and that the Chinese had suffered a major reverse when it was revealed that they themselves had filled the trade gap left by the Africans' boycott.

94. On Rhodesia, it was pointed out in discussion that it would be difficult to limit the use of force. Not only the Kariba Dam but also the mines at Wankie were vital points. A settlement giving independence without majority rule would endanger our position elsewhere in Africa. Mr. Johnston said that force used to protect Zambia would be different in kind from that used cold-bloodedly to impose majority rule; but it was the latter which Africans demanded. Their demands could not be met. We must envisage a situation in which we had reached a negotiated settlement with Rhodesia which had - as it might well have - the support of the majority of the people but not of the Nationalists. Other African countries would be unlikely to be convinced of the democratic basis of such a settlement; we ourselves would need to be convinced. International observers might be accepted by Rhodesia if a settlement pivoted on this.

95. Sir John Russell discussed the value of the Commonwealth concept. Within Africa it derived little from the Commonwealth elsewhere. Africans were much more aware of purely African organisations. Africa was of value to British interests but only marginally. It commanded 35 votes at the United Nations. The nine votes of the Commonwealth countries were more consistently used against us than those of many foreign countries. The immediate return on our aid was negligible. It must clearly continue; but a cold-blooded re-assessment of our goals and interests in Africa was called for.

Mr. MacDonald agreed that our aid programmes should be re-considered. We got little support from the Commonwealth, and there were other countries, such as Ethiopia, which were important to us. We could not expect the concept of the Commonwealth to flourish at once. But there were many indications that it was growing.

96. Mr. Le Quesne suggested that for African Commonwealth Governments the Commonwealth was mainly a means of bringing pressure to bear on Britain. There were excellent reasons for giving them support, but the support would not necessarily benefit Britain. Our influence was the result of past history rather than of the present Commonwealth structure.

97. Sir Saville Garner said that the links of history and of commerce went deep; and that it was often precisely because of the existence of the Commonwealth that its members felt free or even obliged to demonstrate their independence within it. But Commonwealth Prime Ministers Meetings had exercised a moderating influence on African Governments - for instance, at the subsequent Cairo meeting of Non-Aligned States last year. We must expect a decade of adjustment: but the example of India was encouraging. Because of our trade and investment interests, the Commonwealth countries would in any case be the most important countries for Britain in Africa.

98. Mr. Johnston added that the Commonwealth provided a formal framework for co-operation and consultation which was not associated with neo-colonialism or racialism.

/Mr. Fowler

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99. Mr. Fowler suggested that all the ex-colonial powers had their special opportunities and responsibilities in the turbulent post-colonial phase.

100. Mr. Bennett pointed out that the present Government in Rwanda had been as helpful as its resources and position permitted, and that only the Mwami's influence stood between Burundi and either chaos or Communism. Their share of Western aid was dangerously small, and their influence on the Congo could be dangerously great. Regret was expressed over the unpopularity of the U.S.A. in Africa.

101. Sir Paul Gore-Booth summed up by saying that although we had admittedly got a poor return on our political and material investment in the Commonwealth so far, apart from e.g. the Prime Ministers' Meetings, we had great advantages over other outside countries and should wait patiently for our investment to mature.

102. In concluding the Meeting, Mr. George Thomson, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, surveyed the general problems facing Britain in the modern world. The first problem was that of adapting Britain to a changed post-war world with better communications, more intensive nationalisms, greater destructive power and less stability in the developing areas; a world in which not only the nature of the international community, but also Britain's capacity to influence it had radically altered. The ideological attitudes of developing states would have to be modified by an appreciation of their own individual national interests; but their lack of diplomatic experience stood in their way. We should not be defensive about our record in the field of de-colonialisation. We had an excellent record and had never left either Communism or chaos behind us. But within Britain itself we still suffered illusions about the scale of our own real power in the post-Imperial age. There could, for instance, no longer be such a thing as a purely independent foreign policy, although within our alliances we could make a large contribution to interdependence. The limitations on our power were set by our own economic strength yet we still maintained three long-term aims which could conflict: to modernise the structure of our own economy, to maintain one of the world's major reserve currencies, and to honour expensive overseas commitments. Reconciling these aims would take time. A prime consideration was to reduce overseas expenditure - partly in the field of defence but also perhaps in a re-assessment of aid programmes. In the Middle East, for instance, our material interests were greater than in Africa and aid to that area should logically take priority. Our ability to maintain the base in Aden was being considered: and this could affect our ability to influence events in Africa. In the same way if Malaysian "confrontation" should end we would have to consider whether to withdraw militarily from South East Asia altogether.

103. In the Communist world great changes were also taking place. In Europe the balance of power between NATO and the Warsaw Pact had preserved stability. The main danger of a clash now lay in Asia and Africa. It was essential to create collective machinery to check aggression. The Sino-Soviet rift was a cause for alarm, not for complacency. The American alliance was fundamental to British interests, politically and militarily and because of dollar support for sterling. The defence of Britain rested in the last analysis with the Americans. General de Gaulle's attitude was wholly unrealistic.

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But the alliance carried its liabilities, for instance the necessity of supporting American policy in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. In the U.N., the Commonwealth and the field of disarmament Britain could exert a healthy influence and the appointments of Lords Caradon and Chalfont were proof of our intention to do this.

104. The two most important individual problems facing the world were, in the short term to prevent India from becoming a nuclear power, since this would be the point of no return in nuclear proliferation; and in the longer term to bring China into the community of nations. Against this background the direct importance of Africa was limited to its gold, its copper and its votes at the United Nations. We should examine their record there and consider whether we could bring more influence to bear on them. The Commonwealth added an institutional cohesion to a pattern of bilateral links in depth which it would be hard to replace by other means, and the Prime Ministers' Meetings were of great value in improving British contacts with the developing world.

105. In conclusion Mr. Thomson expressed appreciation of the quality of our overseas representation and welcomed the constructive co-operation between the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office together with the growth within them of a unified approach towards the problems of Africa as a whole.

106. Sir Saville Garner closed the meeting by thanking the Heads of Missions for their attendance, and Mr. MacDonald in return expressed their thanks to the Chairman and the Secretariat.

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EASTERN AND CENTRAL AFRICAN HEADS OF MISSION MEETING

Opening statement by Mr. Cledwyn Hughes, M.P.,  
at 3 p.m. on Monday, 17 May

This is the first meeting of its kind bringing together Heads of Mission from East and Central Africa. It is appropriate and helpful that you should all be with us in London on eve of next Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting and at a time when crucial decisions over Rhodesia may be pending. Your collective wisdom will be of great assistance to us.

This is with a vengeance the African decade. Even if sometimes we should like to hear a little less of Africa, the Press and Radio constantly remind us of it. And the publishers remorselessly churn out a steady stream of books on African problems of all kinds. These facts alone underline the importance of the work on which you are all engaged.

Why is Africa - and here I mean Sub-Saharan Africa - so much in the news? In political terms it is one of the most backward areas in the world. Strategically it is of little importance to the West except in the negative sense of denying it to the other side. In terms of raw materials, we could at a pinch live without cocoa, palm oil, sisal and ground nuts. Only copper, gold, and to some degree, diamonds, are of cardinal importance to the West.

So at first sight the immense effort we are lavishing on Africa seems quite out of proportion to its importance, as compared with our stake in the Middle East, South and South East Asia and the Far East.

But in the short term at least Africa is of real importance to both West and East. Whatever the logic of this, the Sub-Saharan countries control 32 Votes in the United Nations. The area is also one of the main test beds for the East-West ideological and material struggle. And within this it represents a still wide open field in which Russia and China are increasingly involved against each other in attempts to establish rival spheres of influence.

Narrowing matters down to specific British interests, we have an important stake in material and human terms in Sub-Saharan Africa. British private investment in Commonwealth Africa alone, excluding banking, insurance and oil, is of the order of £550 million. Earnings from this investment, and from banking and insurance in Commonwealth countries, amounts to some £50 million. Nor can we forget our human hostages to fortune. Even leaving aside South Africa there are some 300,000 White United Kingdom citizens in Commonwealth Africa. Over 10,000 are in Government service, advising or working with the local Armed Forces, or serving under Technical Aid programmes. Above all, we are engaged in a massive way in bilateral economic aid. In the 5 years ending March 1964 41% of all our bilateral aid amounting to over £280 million went to Commonwealth Africa. Apart from this, our aid in the military field is still increasing sharply. And we have also to think of the large numbers of students, again overwhelmingly from Commonwealth Africa, studying in this country and upwards of 1,500 British

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teachers serving in African Commonwealth countries.

In seeking to preserve and foster our political and material interests in Africa, we have to take account of the stresses imposed by the emotional undercurrent of "Africa for the Africans"; and by the drive to eradicate all trace of neo-imperialism and to eliminate the last vestiges of white supremacy.

These stresses and strains are highlighted in the crucial area South of the Zambezi and emphasized through the rivalries within the African camp as between the "continental unity now" theme of Nkrumah, and the more pragmatic approach towards that distant goal of leaders such as Kenyatta and Abubakar.

Behind these strains lie the danger of a major cleavage between Africa and the West over the problems of Rhodesia and South Africa and - worst threat of all - of outright Black-White confrontation.

But this is the gloomier side of the coin. There is much on the other side which entitles us to take a brighter view. With the exception of Rhodesia, our own disengagement from Africa has been carried through with almost miraculous success. Of our ex-dependencies only Ghana and Tanzania give real cause for concern, and of the two I would rate Tanzania as the more lasting danger zone.

Potentially powerfully countries such as Nigeria and Kenya are showing increasing signs of moderate influence on the rest of the African camp. The Congo, for the moment at least, has ceased to be a major point of cleavage between the West and Africa. But the problem of Rhodesia remains acute. Even if - and it is a very big if - we can resolve this in a manner acceptable to African opinion, that might afford us only temporary relief since we should then be all the more exposed to pressures over the Portuguese Territories and South Africa.

So in short, our relations with the independent Black African countries will continue to be conditioned by our policies in the southern part of the continent, the Congo, Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese Territories and South Africa. All of us in Whitehall are only too acutely aware of the extent to which our policies in these and other areas increase the difficulty of your own tasks, and nothing would be more agreeable for me than to be able to say that we saw a possibility of our being able to modify our policies in these areas significantly in the sense desired by the leaders in your countries. The unfortunate truth is, however, that we have in fact very little room for manoeuvre and little scope for modifying our policies in this way.

#### The Congo

Let me turn first to the Congo, which is the one of these four areas in which there has been a real improvement in recent months. In retrospect we can see that the explosion of nationalist sentiment provoked by the Stanleyville operation, and the subsequent debate in the Security Council, resembled an infection which erupted suddenly into a boil which then burst, with a consequent

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relief of tension all round. It looks more and more as if the Security Council debate on the Congo will prove to have been something of a watershed in African politics. It was the first occasion on which the moderate African states stood up and declined to be bullied or led by the nose by the extremists. Once the lead had been given, we have seen opinion in Africa increasingly accepting the proposition that, despite M. Tshombe's history and despite the almost universal dislike of Tshombe by other Africans, he is the legitimate Prime Minister of the Congo and must be treated as such. Today Nyerere is the only man who continues to give aid as a matter of policy to the rebels, though Ben Bella, Nkrumah and Modibo Keita still nurture their frustrated rage.

When Heads of Mission from the West African posts discussed the consequences of the Stanleyville operation in January there was a general feeling that we could deduce from it the practical maxim that if from time to time our interests call for a particular course of action, and if we are satisfied that such a course of action is legally and morally defensible, we should go ahead with it and not allow ourselves to be too much influenced by any immediate clamour from other Africans. I should be interested to hear whether in general terms you would support this view.

Be that as it may, I think it can now be said that the situation in the Congo no longer seriously affects our relations with the other African states, with, of course, the exception of Tanzania.

Our own policy remains what it has been for a long time, namely:-

- (a) to support and strengthen insofar as we can the legitimate government of the Congo; and
- (b) to do what we can to foster an improvement in relations between the Congolese Government and its neighbours.

We are in fact, as some of you know, under fairly heavy pressure from time to time from the Americans to intervene with the governments of the Commonwealth countries in Africa on the question of the Congo. We are in principle, as we have told the Americans, willing to do what we can in this way and I think that we have been able to exercise a useful influence in this sense. We think, however, that we have to be careful not to use up our credit carelessly in M. Tshombe's interests. We therefore try to limit our instructions to you to intervene with your respective governments to matters of real importance, on which we think there is some chance of our representations being effective. Let me take this opportunity of thanking you all for the skilful way in which you have, each in your own country, contributed by your representations to the very marked improvement in the relations between the Congo and its neighbours to which I have referred.

Rhodesia

The General Election in Rhodesia has gone, as expected, strongly in favour of Mr. Smith's Rhodesia Front and he has now emerged in complete control of the Rhodesian Parliament.

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This means that he can make certain changes to the Constitution but not ones which touch on the specially entrenched provisions. It must be expected that, subject to the negotiations with Britain, he will proceed on these lines.

For Britain the next move is to take up again with Mr. Smith the private negotiations which were begun before the election, following upon the Commonwealth Secretary's visit. The area of manoeuvre is extremely limited and there is very little more than a foothold on which to base the next stage of the talks. But, although the chances of a successful negotiation are slender, we are not entirely without hope. The indications are that Mr. Smith is in no particular hurry to bring the negotiations to a head, and he does appear to wish to reach an agreed settlement with us if at all possible.

The next approach to Mr. Smith will probably be on the basis of an attempt to establish with him five principles which have in fact already been canvassed with certain Commonwealth leaders who have generally expressed their approval.

These principles are:-

- (i) Our need to be satisfied on acceptability.
- (ii) Some immediate constitutional improvement for Africans.
- (iii) A guarantee of continuing progress towards majority rule.
- (iv) A guarantee against retrogressive amendment to the Constitution.
- (v) Progress towards eliminating racial discrimination.

It cannot yet be said what reception Mr. Smith will give these principles, although for us they are basic to the whole approach. If we could succeed in establishing a substantial degree of agreement on the principles, we could then begin to negotiate towards specific constitutional proposals for putting them into effect. We cannot speculate at this stage on how long it will take or how far we (and Mr. Smith) will eventually be able to go within this broad framework. The dilemma in negotiation is to avoid on the one hand being manoeuvred by Mr. Smith into a position where he can publicly turn down British "terms" for independence which he will claim have been presented to him on a "take it or leave it" basis: and, on the other hand, becoming committed to Mr. Smith in advance of a "package" settlement on arrangements which would not go far enough to satisfy African Commonwealth Governments. The essence of the problem is whether a middle way can be found between independence on the basis of the constitution as it stands and independence on the basis of immediate majority rule. Mr. Smith may be ready to shift a bit but is severely trammelled. The African nationalists in Rhodesia are completely intransigent in their demand for immediate majority rule, backed if necessary by British force. The African Commonwealth Governments might be prepared to accept some compromise from this extreme position, but again only to a very limited extent. All the signs (e.g. recent messages to British Ministers from Kenya and Uganda) are that

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the African position is hardening. There is thus a wide gap to be bridged, and we must have no illusions about the prospects of success.

Meanwhile, Mr. Smith has said that he will not make a u.d.i. while negotiations continue. We are inclined to take him at his word. We do not therefore think that such an illegal move is imminent. But the danger of it taking place some time later this year remains high. The British Government fully intends to go through with the measures foreshadowed in the Prime Minister's October and April statements and detailed planning to deal with the resultant situation is now in an advanced stage.

The Southern African Territories

Basutoland may well become independent next year and Bechuanaland and Swaziland shortly thereafter. These territories will remain dependent on us for budgetary support since they are all very poor. They are also heavily and inescapably dependent on South Africa with which they are all in customs union and to which they all export labour and goods on a large scale. The relationship of these territories as they become independent with the Republic will be one of the trickiest issues with which we and the South Africans will be faced in the next year or two.

The Portuguese Territories

We made clear our public attitude on the Portuguese territories as long ago as 1963, and we have since reaffirmed it. It is that Portugal should grant these territories self-determination in the generally accepted sense of the word, though we recognise that the timing and method of this must remain the responsibility of Portugal as the administering power. The Portuguese of course claim, as the French used to of Algeria, that their African territories are a part of Portugal. On the whole, we think that these territories are reasonably run. But the Portuguese cannot hope to succeed in the long run in a policy which ignores the history of the last few years in Africa and particularly the fact that we and the French have given independence to our African colonies. On the other hand, they are most unlikely to modify their policies so long as Salazar lives. We recognise that pressure from the O.A.U. is likely to increase and that African frustration is very deep, but there is in practice little we can do to influence the Portuguese. They are aware of our views but do not accept them, and it serves no useful purpose to antagonise Portugal

without any hope of moving them. Lecturing the Portuguese, which we have done in the past, gets us nowhere. But while the hard reality is that we shall probably have to go on living with this problem at least until death comes to our aid by removing Salazar, we shall certainly keep our eyes open to any and every possibility of moving the Portuguese and thus of improving our posture with the Africans. However I shall be interested to learn from you whether or not you think there is some further positive step we should usefully take in relation to the Portuguese problem.

Bringing matters more closely down to your particular countries, how have we fared to date and what are the prospects ahead?

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As I have said, there are growing signs of moderate influence coming to the surface and of the extremists being gradually cut down to size. Recent events in Kenya, for instance, underline the Africans' distrust and disillusionment with the Russians and Chinese. On the other hand, Nyerere seems to have allowed his country, chiefly through Zanzibar, to become a bridgehead for expansion of Communist influence in Africa. This has shaken the morale of the local British community and tends to give East Africa generally a bad press in Britain. There are other unhelpful signs throughout East Africa. Hopes of a Federation now seem finally quashed and the Common Market and Common Services Organisation are in danger of breaking up.

This gives rise to a number of questions, which it will be your task to debate this week. We must consider whether we have got our assessment right. How seriously should we take the Communist threat in East Africa? To what degree are the worst features of Government activity in Uganda and Tanzania due to immaturity rather than to a conscious desire to lean over towards the East? Are the encouraging trends in Kenya and Zambia likely to extend to the whole region, or is the Tanzania pattern the one most likely to prevail in the longer term? Is there any prospect of reaching a settlement with Mr. Smith which would be acceptable generally to opinion in East and Central Africa?

Are our existing policies on the right lines? Are we employing all the available weapons in our armoury? To what extent should political considerations determine the distribution of our aid? Should we concentrate more or less on military as opposed to civil aid? Can we do anything to restore the shattered American image in East Africa? Is there scope for increased co-ordination of Western aid efforts? Can the African States themselves be encouraged to help each other, e.g. through the E.C.A? Are we supporting the right people in Tanzania and Malawi? What more can we do to encourage such moderate leaders as Kaunda and Kenyatta? If matters go from bad to worse in Tanzania, should we consciously think in terms of gradual disengagement? Or would it be in our interests to endeavour to isolate Tanzania and to prevent the spread of Communist infection to the rest of East and Central Africa? Mr. Fowler will recall that we had a long discussion into the early hours of the morning on this and other problems with Sir David Hunt in Nairobi last December.

Above all, how are we to play our cards in relation to the crucial problems south of the Zambesi?

I have spoken of the importance to Britain of Africa south of the Sahara and of the importance that Her Majesty's Government attach to the area, especially in the Commonwealth context. But to end without qualification would, I am afraid, be to mislead you. For those of us in the Government who have to look at the world as a whole, it is no good denying that, despite its immense size, Africa is only of relatively importance in any global appreciation of British or Western interests. With a population of just under two hundred million the area represents barely a third of the population of India,

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only twice that of Indonesia, Pakistan or Japan and only slightly more than half that of Latin America. In the list of the main British export markets last year only three African countries feature amongst the first 27. Two of them are South Africa and Rhodesia. The third is not on the East Coast of Africa. Moreover, as The Times pointed out last week in writing of next month's meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, "African problems are not the only or even the main ones". It is in the Far East that the West is at present making its main military effort, the United States in Viet Nam, and Britain in Malaysia, with over fifty thousand men involved in an undeclared war on behalf of this young Commonwealth member, and with the full support of Australia and New Zealand. In Europe, the area of the world most vital to the security of these islands themselves, the powerful voice of General de Gaulle is being raised in an effort to break the vital links established in the past twenty years between Great Britain, Continental Europe and the United States. I am sure you will all have read the Prime Minister's speeches to the recent meetings in London of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the South East Asia Treaty Organisation. They give a very clear picture of the problems confronting us in these areas.

But the greatest of all our problems at present lies even nearer home. At the end of last year this country was in serious economic difficulties. Only a major rescue operation by our friends in America and Europe tided us over. The situation has greatly improved since then. In particular the trend of our exports in the first quarter of this year is distinctly heartening. But over the next five years we have the awesome task of making our way in the world and at the same time repaying international borrowing of about £900 million - roughly the present size of our gold and dollar reserves. This is why the Government has been obliged to conduct a stringent review of all overseas expenditure and especially of our overseas defence expenditure. This has to be done against a background of the inescapable commitment in South East Asia which I have mentioned; of the need to ensure stability in the Middle East and to protect one of the largest British investments in the world; and to counter divisive Gaullist tactics in Europe by firm support for our NATO and Brussels Treaty commitments. The question is, can we possibly continue to do all these things and at the same time increase or even maintain our current level of external aid, of which as you know nearly half goes to sub-Saharan Africa. You will not expect me to answer these questions today. They are under urgent study at the moment. But I feel bound to warn you that unpleasant decisions may have to be taken. These could result in a substantial reduction of British capability to intervene militarily in East Africa or of our ability to increase aid programmes to the area, desirable as this may be. I thought you would not thank me if I did not put these difficulties to you very bluntly. I need hardly say that they underline the need for the utmost skill in the conduct of your diplomatic activity if only because the material instruments at your disposal seem bound to be less readily available than hitherto.

A critical time lies ahead of you, but the Commonwealth Secretary and I have complete confidence in your devotion and in your ability to represent the best interests of our country.

**SECRET**

AGENDA

Monday, 17 May, Afternoon 1. British policy and objectives in Africa with special reference to East and Central Africa.  
The influence on the area of events in South Africa, Rhodesia, the Portuguese territories and the Congo.

Tuesday, 18 May, Morning 2. Movements towards African unity: in particular O.A.U., E.C.A. and regional co-operation movements in East Africa.  
Commonwealth influence in East Africa.

Wednesday, 19 May, Morning 3. & Afternoon Overt and subversive activities by the Communist countries & African states; and means of counteracting them.

Afternoon 4. Information and Cultural Policy

Thursday, 20 May, Morning 5. Our economic and military aid programmes and policies.

Friday, 21 May, Morning 6. Final Session.

MINUTES OF MEETING OF HEADS OF MISSIONS IN EAST & CENTRAL AFRICA

17 - 21 May, 1965

Distribution List

Foreign Office

P.S. to Minister of State  
(Mr. George Thomson)  
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J. I. C.

(1062/65G)

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BRITISH EMBASSY,

LOME.

3 July, 1965.

B Teamup  
JN 7/1 51  
Chairman IS

Dear J.I.C.,

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Please refer to the most interesting J.I.C. Paper (65) 30 (Final) of 25 May.

2. It may be worth reporting, in connexion with Appendix A to Annex A, that the Tass correspondent listed under Togo (Serial 21) is in fact resident in Dahomey (Serial 7).

3. With regard to the references to the Chinese having established "useful footholds", appearing in paragraph 20, page 15, our friend's latest information on Dahomey (derived from a recent French liaison report - marked "Guard") is that there are now in Cotonou a Chinese Chargé d'Affaires, one Second Secretary and six "Fonctionnaires de 2e. classe" - already a fairly sizeable complement.

4. I am copying this to West and Central African Department and to the Chancery at Abidjan, and enclose two spares.

Yours ever.

E.M. Smith

(E.M. Smith)

21

Joint Intelligence Committee,  
Cabinet Office,  
London, S.W.1.

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BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION  
Permanent House, Independence Avenue  
P.O. Box 9200, DAR ES SALAAM, Tanganyika  
Telegrams: UKREP, Dar es Salaam  
Telephone: Dar es Salaam 23366

RECEIVED  
28 JUN 1965 (10)  
J. . . C.

Our reference: (2) Z. 137/22/1.  
Our reference:

Dear Mr. McNeill,

Russian and Chinese Advisers

(62)

In your telegram No. 1058 of 3 June you asked for the latest available information on the numbers and activities of Russian and Chinese military advisers both on the mainland and in Zanzibar.

2. On the mainland the Chinese military training team is eleven strong (not fifteen) and has recently been instructing at the Police Training School, Moshi, having finished their assignment with the reserve force. We are not sure if they are still there. Brigadier Sarakikya is said to be anxious to see them leave the country.

3. We believe there are an unknown number of Chinese military advisers at a training camp near Kigoma, said to be engaged in weapon training of Congolese rebels. The Congo (Leo) Embassy here think the Chinese there number about twenty.

4. As for the situation in Zanzibar, I discussed this with Jim Bourn when he was over here earlier last week and he has now sent me the enclosed minute.

5. I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to Norman Aspin.

Yours sincerely,  
Stephens Miles.  
(F. S. Miles).

Major-General J. M. McNeill, C.B., C.B.E., (+ 1 spare)  
Commonwealth Relations Office,  
Downing Street,  
London, S.W.1.

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24 JUN 1965  
P. I. C. G. A. T. S.  
OF LETTER.....  
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ZANZIBAR

Mr. Miles.

We spoke briefly on Tuesday about C.R.O. telegram No. 1058 about Russian and Chinese advisers. The following comments about Zanzibar aspects of the telegram may be useful to you in the preparation of a reply.

2. I think that the estimate of 23 Russian and 15 Chinese military advisers may be correct. At least I have no information to refute it. 50 Russians seems too high a figure and is more likely to be the total of both civil and military advisers.

3. I have little recent news about the activities of these military advisers. The Chinese are still believed to be concentrated at Mtoni barraks and the Russians at Chukwani. I have just reported separately some information about a plan for the construction of a military camp at Mbago and this is evidently being handled by Russians, and not Chinese.

4. As regards Russians, there have been a number of reports that several families will be leaving soon, but I do not know if these include any military advisers. I have no information about the Cuban advisers mentioned. They might, however, be the outcome of the visit of Che Guevara last February. I have not seen any evidence of the ascendancy of the Chinese over the Russians in the field of military advice here. In fact the presence of the Russian advisers in the discussions (separately reported) about the establishment of the Mbago military camp rather suggests the contrary; but this it is true is only one incident. If Russian military advisers are leaving it may be primarily because they are more expensive than Chinese. The latter live more simply and in any case they are paid out of Chinese credits to the Zanzibar Government, whereas the Russians, so I understand, are on contract terms and are paid salaries from Zanzibar funds, apart from the costs of any local transport, etc. with which they are provided.

5. Some Russians are known to have made scornful comments about the abilities etc. of the Zanzibaris and this may have got back to the Government, but I have seen no indication that the Russians are in any way unpopular with the Zanzibar military forces.

(Signed) J. Bourn.

17 June, 1965.

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J.I.C./510/65

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CABINET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

SOVIET AND CHINESE INFLUENCE IN TANZANIA

In connection with your discussion under J.I.C.(65)  
23rd Meeting, Item 8, about Soviet and Chinese influence  
in Tanzania, Mr. Johnston has forwarded the letter attached  
at Annex.

*44*

(Signed) J.M.C. VIVIAN

for Secretary,  
Joint Intelligence Committee

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

11th June, 1965

DISTRIBUTION

J.I.C.  
J.I.S.('B' Team)

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Annex to J.I.C./510/65

COPY OF A LETTER (L.O.: 536), DATED 9th JUNE, 1965  
FROM MR. P.A.E. JOHNSTON TO THE SECRETARY,  
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

At last week's meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee you may recall there was some discussion about Soviet and Chinese influence in Tanzania and that Mr. Walsh Atkins expressed some interest in having Canadian views, having in mind our experience in the training of Tanzanian armed forces.

I have passed on his enquiry to the Canadian J.I.C. and have now had the following reply which you may want to relay to Mr. Walsh Atkins and any other Members of the Committee who you think may be interested:

"Until we hear from Dar-es-Salaam in answer to a similar question we have put to our mission we will not be in a position to give you an up-to-date assessment on Tanzanian relations with the Russians or the Chinese. We would particularly wish to await a report on Chou En Lai's visit before giving an assessment of relations with the Chinese.

"However it certainly was our impression before agreeing to supplement our army training programme with the air training scheme that the Tanzanians were anxious to be rid as soon as possible of the Chinese and Russian military advisers and to have no more come in. It nevertheless seemed apparent that while Western help is preferred by the Tanzanians, unless it is prompt and generous Communist assistance will be accepted. The fact that the Chinese apparently can supply unlimited amounts of second rate goods free of Tanzanian ports within two months of receiving orders naturally influences Tanzanian decisions on the purchase of equipment. We do not think however that the Tanzanians have reached a final decision as to which countries they will rely on for aid. In the opinion of our High Commissioner if Tanzania were really pro-Communist it would surely be strange that they should so consistently seek help from the West in the important area of defence and security.

"The publicly stated policy of Tanzania is non-alignment. As Communist missions have opened in Tanzania however Communist influence and propaganda have spread. The relative influence of the Russians as opposed to that of the Chinese is at this point not clear. Nyerere's visit to Peking seemed to indicate signs of fundamental disagreement on some points. For President Nyerere the visit was part of the balancing act which many African leaders perform in the hope of preventing excessive influence in their countries of either East or West. While he was in London in April he replied to a press question on Chinese influence by saying 'We do not take orders from Peking. We are not a Peking colony, nor do we take orders from Russia or East Germany'. It remains to be seen whether Nyerere is strong enough to give reality to the policy of non-alignment."

**CONFIDENTIAL**

M.G.L. Joy, Esq

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S E C R E T

FROM COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE TO DAR-ES-SALAAM

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

No. 1058  
3 June, 1965

D. 1330 4 June, 1965

325/1.

SECRET

Addressed to Dar-es-Salaam telegram No.1058 of 3 June  
Repeated for information to:- Zanzibar

RUSSIAN AND CHINESE ADVISERS

JIC would be grateful for the latest available information on the numbers and activities of Russian and Chinese military advisers both on the mainland and in Zanzibar.

2. We know that the Russian Mission has left the mainland, and believe that the 15 strong Chinese team is at present training the small reserve element of the TPDF. In Zanzibar we think that there are about 50 Russian and 15 Chinese military instructors still active on the island.

3. We should also be glad of your comments on the American view that the reduction of the Russian military Mission is a further indication of rising Chinese influence and Tanzanian displeasure with the Russians. The Americans estimate that 23 Russian military advisers remain in Zanzibar (excluding the crew of Karume's aircraft) and believe it likely that the Zanzibaris intend to replace them with Chinese or Cuban advisers.

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8. WEEKLY SURVEY OF INTELLIGENCE

(Previous reference: J.I.C.(65)22nd Meeting, Item 3)

The Committee had their weekly discussion of current intelligence.

The Committee:-

- (1) Approved the Weekly Survey of Intelligence and the Abridged Survey as amended in discussion and instructed the Secretary to issue them.
- (2) Invited the Commonwealth Relations Office to ask their High Commissioner in Dar-es-Salaam for the latest available information on the numbers and activities of Chinese and Russian advisers both in Tanganyika and Zanzibar.

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